Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets by Bradley, Caroline
Draft: August 18, 2005
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 
FOR THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Caroline Bradley
University of Miami School of Law
P.O. Box 248087
Coral Gables, Fl., 33124
Tel: (305) 284-2082
Fax: (305) 284-6506
cbradley@law.miami.edu
http://www.blenderlaw.com
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, Fl., 33124
cbradley@law.miami.edu  I would like to acknowledge the University of Miami School of Law’s support for the
writing of this article. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a Symposium on Global Governance
at the University of Miami and at the Law and Society Conference in 2005. © Caroline Bradley 2005. All rights
reserved.
1 Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1,
1 (2005). See id. at 17: “If we try to represent law — or regulation — as other than a dimension of
governing we are surely losing our way.” 
2 Id. at 23. Roberts describes the value of negotiated orders as follows: “Negotiated orders have
their own rationalities: they involve a different orientation to the normative repertoire from those of state
law; decision-making is through agreement, reached through cyclical processes of information exchange
and learning, rather than the imposed order of a third party; different forms of trust are necessarily
involved.” Id.
3 By focusing on the regulation of international financial activity (excluding informal financial
transactions carried out through mechanisms such as hawala) I am necessarily focusing on regulation
produced by actors from developed economies and, in particular by actors from developed western
economies. 
4 See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, 28, (2000) (“The last
two decades of the twentieth century saw the rise of a ‘new regulatory state’, where states do not so much
run things as regulate them or monitor self-regulation. Self-regulatory organizations frequently become
more important than states in the epistemic communities where debates over regulatory design are
framed.”) 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In his 2004 Chorley lecture, Simon Roberts argued against the modern trend to
“loosen the conceptual bonds between law and government”.1  Roberts is concerned
that by expanding the range of what we call law we undermine the meaning of the
descriptor. But he is also concerned that “under an onslaught of jural discourse and
institutional design, [the] distinctive values of negotiated order, far from being
celebrated, are actually effaced.”2
In financial regulation3 it is easy to subscribe to this distinction between state-
centred law and negotiated rules (whether we describe them as “law” or not). It is
common, for example, to distinguish between governmental and “self-regulatory” rules.4
But this apparent sharp distinction between governmental and self-regulation soon
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5 Stock exchanges have always been able to exercise quasi-regulatory powers. Now they
commonly exercise regulatory powers under the authority of statutes. See, e.g., SRO Consultative
Comm., Int’l Org. of Secs. Comm’ns, Model for Effective Regulation, 3 (May 2000) available at
http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2000-effective_self-regulation.pdf  (“In several jurisdictions around the
world, effective self-regulation existed before statutory regulation. As markets developed, market
participants recognized that regulation was necessary in order to protect the integrity of the market.
Industry participants recognized that those who were most familiar with the customs and practices of a
particular trade were best suited to create rules related to that trade, to enforce those rules and to resolve
the disputes that arose from those rules. Moreover, the familiarity with the concepts involved ensured that
such disputes were quickly resolved and that the rules for commerce in that particular market continually
and quickly adapted to the evolutions in the manner in which trade was conducted.”
6 Jenny Anderson, A New Inquiry Into Big Board Specialists, New York Times, C1 (Feb. 7, 2005)
(reporting that the Manhattan US Attorney’s office was investigating whether NYSE members had cheated
customers through illegal trading practices).
7 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71256 (Dec.
8, 2004) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.pdf  .
8 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Disclosure and Regulatory Reporting by Self-Regulatory Organizations; Recordkeeping Requirements for
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Ownership and Voting Limitations for Members of Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Ownership Reporting Requirements for Members of Self-Regulatory Organizations; Listing
and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory Organization, 69 Fed. Reg 71126 (Dec. 8, 2004)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-51019.pdf . See also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed
Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. 60287 (Oct. 8 , 2004) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-50486.pdf
9 See, e.g., Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, Industry Self-regulation in Consumer Markets,
v, vii (Aug. 2000) available at
http://www.consumersonline.gov.au/downloads/selfreg/taskforce/FinalReport/final_report.pdf (“Self-
regulation is increasingly being used as an alternative to quasi-regulation and government legislation and
3
breaks down: self-regulatory organisations often derive (or appear to derive) their
(quasi) regulatory authority from the state.5 Members of an SRO may find that they
have to look beyond their SRO to assess the risks that they will be subject to
enforcement action.6 Self-regulatory rules may be introduced in order to fend off formal
governmental regulation. At the same time governmental regulation may look very
much like a negotiated order and may give effect to private agendas. 
The debate in financial regulation about the respective weights which should be
accorded to governmental and self-regulatory rules is a live one. At the end of 2004 the
US SEC published a concept release on self-regulation,7 and proposed new rules to
apply to SROs.8  Governments9 and international organisations10 have examined how
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there is some overlap between them. Identifying best practice in self-regulation, and identifying the limits
of self-regulatory schemes, has important implications for the government’s approach toward a more
efficient regulatory framework for both businesses and consumers. The role of government in encouraging
self-regulation also has an impact on compliance costs, flexibility and the coverage of
self-regulation”.. “The Government also has the objective that industry should take increased ownership
and responsibility for developing efficient and effective self-regulation where it is the most appropriate
regulatory response.”)
10 See, e.g., Model for Effective Regulation, note 5 above.
11 See, e.g., Restoring the Public’s Trust in the New York Stock Exchange, 1 (Sept 24, 2003)
available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2003/20030924nyse.pdf (“the disclosures that led
to the resignation of Richard Grasso as the NYSE’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer have revealed
that some of the problems that precipitated the market crisis of the past two years are reflected in the
conduct of the NYSE itself. It is clear that there is a need for fundamental, urgent, and sweeping reforms
at the NYSE, to restore the faith and confidence of investors.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Concept Release,
supra note 7 at 71259; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges National Stock Exchange and Its CEO, David
Colker, for Failure to Enforce Exchange Rules, (May 19, 2005) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-79.htm  . Reena Aggarwal, notes some of these criticisms but
describes advantages of SROs as follows: “SROs offer the following advantages over government
agencies: business interests, ability to self-police, resources, close proximity to the markets, and
flexibility.” Reena Aggarwal, Regulatory Infrastructure Covering Financial Markets, BROOKINGS-WHARTON
PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 55, 74 (2001)
12 Charlie McCreevy,  European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Governance and
Accountability in Financial Services, Speech at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of
European Parliament, Brussels, Speech 05/64 (Feb. 1, 2005) (The governance, financing, participation in
and the accountability of international standard setters, in particular the International Accounting
Standards Board, is becoming a subject of heated public debate.”)
13 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Rule, Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 21306 (Apr. 25, 2005) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8570fr.pdf ; Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, Press Release, Sen. Shelby Announces Banking Committee Priorities, Planned Schedule for
109th Congress (Jan. 19, 2005) available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=177&Month=1
&Year=2005 ; Bank for International Settlements, Committee on the Global Financial System, The Role of
Ratings in Structured Finance: Issues and Implications (January 2005) available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf ; IOSCO Technical Committee, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for
4
self-regulation does and can work in financial markets. In recent years SROs have been
criticised for being ineffective as regulators of financial market participants.11 In January
2005, Charlie McCreevy, the EU’s internal market commissioner, noted that
governance of international standard setters was “becoming a subject of heated public
debate”.12 Credit Rating Agencies, hitherto unregulated, may be subject to some form of
regulation in the future.13
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Credit Rating Agencies, (December 2004) available at
http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf ; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Concept Release, Rating
Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 35258 (Jun. 12,
2003) available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/pdf/03-14867.pdf
14 See, e.g., George Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 Bell J. Of Econ. & Mgt. Sci.
3, 3 (1971) (“A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The politics of
government decision making: A theory of regulatory capture, 106 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 1089 (1991). Cf.
John P. Burke, Commissioner of Banking, State of Connecticut, Comments to the National Conference of
State Legislatures Annual Meeting Salt Lake City, Utah (Jul. 22, 2004) available at 
http://www.csbs.org/pr/speeches/2004/JackBurke_NCSL_Address_072204.pdf (“this amassing of control
by Washington insiders is being compounded by the Securities Exchange Commission talking about
additional centralization and a push by the insurance industry to have a national charter not subject to
state oversight or regulation.”)
15 See, e.g., John P Burke, Comments, note 14 above. The Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, which describe themselves as “Champions of the State Banking System” include the
following language in their Statement of Principles: “Bank supervision is best conducted at the state level,
where regulators are accessible and in tune with the local economy” 
5
The argument that domestic financial regulation is influenced by private sector
groups through lobbying and capture is not new.14 Commentators have argued in the
past that harmonisation of regulation in the EU allows business groups to have a
greater influence on the development of rules than they would at the domestic level. But
the capture story is clearly not the only story about regulation. At the domestic level,
particularly in an environment with competing regulators, regulators may seek to appeal
to different constituencies. State banking regulators in the US are now arguing against
the OCC’s actions on pre-emption by emphasising that the state regulators protect
individual consumers of banking services more effectively than the OCC can.15
Financial firms do not always succeed in protecting themselves from liability even where
they are only doing what other similar firms are doing.
This paper argues that transnational financial transactions create new
opportunities for private groups to influence legal and regulatory rules.
Internationalization of the financial markets has led to harmonization of financial law.
Much harmonization of financial law occurs through processes which are apparently
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16 Although note that legislators often feel distanced from the harmonization process. See, e.g.,
IMF deepens dialogue with Central American legislators, 34 IMF SURVEY 178 (Jun. 20, 2005) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2005/062005.pdf
17 The EU produces binding rules, bodies such as IOSCO produce formally non-binding
principles.
18 See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency Statement –
U.S. Implementation of Basel II Framework Qualification Process – IRB and AMA (Jan. 27, 2005)
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20050127/attachment.pdf
19 For example, the IMF has become more involved in recent years in issues of financial
regulation. Independent group to review IMF’s financial sector, capital markets work, 34 IMF Survey 172
(Jun. 20, 2005) available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2005/062005.pdf  (“The rising
importance of private capital flows and of a stable and well-functioning financial sector have led to a
greater emphasis on these areas in the IMF’s work. “It is now time,” de Rato said, “to review the ways in
which the IMF has adapted.” Also, as part of an ongoing strategic review of the IMF, the organization’s
Executive Board has asked that increased attention be given to financial regulation and oversight and to
the determinants of capital flows and their regulation. “This increased attention would mean that in Article
IV surveillance, IMF missions would increasingly examine the regulations and environment in which
domestic financial institutions and private capital markets operate, with attention to factors governing
6
public, state-centred and transparent16 but in this paper I describe three ways in which
private and opaque processes have a significant influence on policy development in the
area of financial law. These are private international law-making through private
involvement in public rule-making processes, through contracting, and through the
actions of private sector regulatory entrepreneurs. 
2.0 PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC RULE-MAKING PROCESSES
Rules which affect participants in international financial transactions may be
adopted at the supranational level or at the domestic level. Increasingly supranational
bodies are developing harmonised rules or principles of financial regulation.17 Even
where supranational rule-making occurs, domestic legislation or rule-making may be
necessary for implementation.18 It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between
private involvement in the work of supranational or transnational public rule-making
processes and private involvement in domestic public rule-making processes. At the
same time, developments at the supranational level can have a significant impact on
domestic rule-making (and vice versa).19 Regulatory developments in one domestic
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inward and outward flows of lending, equity investment, and direct foreign investment,”de Rato stated.”)
20 Cf. Transatlantic Business Dialogue Report to the 2005 EU-US Summit, A Framework for
Deepening Transatlantic Trade and Investment, 7 (April 2005) available at 
http://128.121.145.19/tabd/media/TABD2005SummitReportFINAL051.pdf  (“In spite of the many on-going
regulatory dialogues, too often regulators develop and implement rules, regulations and requirements on
business in relative isolation. Since regulators are subject to entirely separate legal mandates and
legislative oversight, it is difficult for both business and administrations to ensure that their concerns are
heard. We respect that sovereign prerogatives and legislative mandates must be taken into account, but
we are concerned that, if regulations continue to be developed on both sides of the Atlantic without regard
to the impact on the transatlantic market, divergent approaches will emerge which will negatively affect the
ability of business to expand trade, investment and innovation. Recent regulatory actions (such as
Sarbanes-Oxley in the US, and the chemicals regulation in the EU) have highlighted the need for
regulators and legislators to consider the external implications of their actions. It is vital to have a clear
structure and process across the transatlantic regulatory landscape, not just in a few sectors.”)
21 See, e.g., Leo Van Houtven, GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF:DECISION MAKING, INSTITUTIONAL
OVERSIGHT, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY, 2,  IMF Pamphlet Series No. 53 (Aug, 2002) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam53/pam53.pdf (noting that some IMF critics argued that the
IMF should be “more democratic, more transparent, more accountable, and more participatory.”) Cf.
Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, in Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, ¶ 70,  A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) available at
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/report-largerfreedom.pdf  (“The Bretton Woods institutions have already
taken some steps to strengthen the voice and participation of developing countries. But more significant
steps are needed to overcome the widespread perception among developing countries that they are
underrepresented in both bodies, which in turn tends to put their legitimacy in doubt.”)
22 See, e.g., EU Commission, Report on European Governance (2003-2004) 4-5  (Sept. 22, 2004)
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/docs/rapport_gouvernance_2003-2004_en.pdf .
Governments and public agencies including the BIS, the OECD, the IMF, the Bank of England and the US
Federal Reserve publicise their research papers through the Social Science Research Network at
7
jurisdiction may have an impact on rule-making in another.20
As the volume and impact of supranational rules and principles has increased,
so financial firms and their trade associations have begun to try to influence the
development of these rules and principles at the supranational level. Processes which
were originated as mechanisms of co-operation between domestic regulators have
begun to look more like domestic regulatory processes with increased input from non-
state agents. These developments have occurred during the same period in which the
anti-globalisation movement has motivated the international financial institutions to
focus on increasing the transparency of their actions.21 Supranational actors seek to
increase their apparent legitimacy by involving “stakeholders” or “civil society” in their
work.22 Observers monitor governance in these supranational organisations.23
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http://www.ssrn.com .
23 See, e.g., Hetty Kovach, Caroline Neligan and Simon Burall, Power Without Accountability?
The Global Accountability Report 1 (2003) available at
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/documents/GAP2003.pdf
24 The World Bank and IMF have been working on issues of governance for some time, although
their focus has mostly been on domestic governance. See, e.g., World Bank, World Development Report
2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone, 1 (2004) ("Government policies and behaviors play a key
role in shaping the investment climate. While governments have limited influence on factors such as
geography, they have more decisive influence on the security of property rights, approaches to regulation
and taxation (both at and within the border), the provision of infrastructure, the functioning of finance and
labor markets, and broader governance features such as corruption. Improving government policies and
behaviors that shape the investment climate drives growth and reduces poverty.") available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf ; D. Kaufmann A. Kraay,
and M. Mastruzzi,  Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004 (2005) (Draft, May 9,
2005) available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters%20IV%20main.pdf . The
World Bank and IMF have begun to comment on governance issues in supranational standard setters.
See, e.g., World Bank, IMF, Comments on draft “IOSCO Consultation Policy and Procedures.”, in IOSCO
Public Comments, infra note 71 at 9. 
25 See, e.g., infra, text at note 66
26 See, e.g., Securities Industry Association (SIA), Comments on CESR Draft Statement on
Consultation Practices, 2-3 (Nov. 19, 2001) available at
http://www.sia.com/2001_comment_letters/pdf/CESR.pdf . See also SIA, Discussion Paper, Promoting
Fair and Transparent Regulation, available at 
http://www.sia.com/2001_comment_letters/pdf/CESR_-_Appendix.pdf . 
8
In the absence of generally agreed procedures for supranational governance,24
standard setters and those whose activities their standards may affect are negotiating
principles of governance.25  Financial trade associations argue that regulation in the
global capital markets should be transparent. For example, the Securities Industry
Association says that rules should be adopted only for legitimate public policy
objectives, that they should be enforced fairly, and not retrospectively, that they should
be publicly available and that they should be “clear and understandable”.26 None of
these claims appears to be controversial, although there is scope for debate about
when a rule is or is not adopted for legitimate public policy objectives or when rules are
“clear and understandable”.
Financial firms and their trade associations have a clear incentive to participate
in negotiations about governance procedures in supranational standard setting bodies. 
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27 Financial firms and their trade associations sponsor research. For example, the Nasdaq
Educational Foundation, Inc. sponsors research and education to “promote learning about capital
formation, financial markets and entrepreneurship through innovative educational programs.”  Nasdaq
Stock Market Educational Foundation, Inc. 2005 Grant Guidelines, available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/services/2005_grant_guide.doc . In mid 2005 Nasdaq discontinued a broader
program of engagement with the academic community. The Federation of European Stock Exchanges
awards the Joseph de la Vega prize annually for research on the securities markets. See
http://www.fese.be/delavega/index.htm . The Chamber of Commerce argued that the SEC should have
paid more attention than it did to a paper funded by Fidelity Investments in considering how to regulate
investment company boards. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the USA v Securities and Exchange
Commission available at http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200506/04-1300a.pdf 
(“The particulars of the Chamber’s first contention are that the Commission should have directed its staff
to do a study of the effect of an independent chairman upon fund performance and that when such a
study, commissioned by Fidelity Investments, was presented during the comment period, the
Commission gave it short shrift.”)
28 See infra, text at note 98.
9
The Basle Capital Accord taught banks that they needed to pay attention to
supranational standards because these standards could affect their bottom line. The
EU’s financial market integration project also gives financial firms incentives to pay
attention to supranational rules. But other groups, such as financial firms’ customers, do
not have such immediate incentives to participate in these supranational processes.
Moreover they often lack the resources to participate effectively. Effective participation
in consultations about financial regulation requires time and expertise.27 It also usually
requires a good knowledge of English.28 Financial regulation is often highly technical
and detailed, and at the supranational level, as at the domestic level,  the stakeholders
who speak loudest and most frequently are regulated financial firms and their trade
associations. 
Because harmonisation of financial regulation occurs at different levels
(supranational, national, sub-national) or layers through processes of agreement and
implementation of standards, and because each level of decision-maker is likely to
invite public comment on its work, the harmonisation process multiplies the possibilities
for well-resourced organisations to influence the content of the rules. A large financial
firm or financial trade association is more likely than a small firm to know what
proposals exist around the world which may ultimately affect its (or its members’)
business, and it is more likely than a smaller organisation to have the resources to try to
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29 Cf. EU Commission, European Governance: Better Lawmaking, COM (2002) 275 final 3 (Jun.
5, 2002) available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2002/com2002_0275en01.pdf (“Are the
smallest voices really and always heard?”); European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of the
Section for External Relations on The Social Dimension of Globalisation – the EU’s policy contribution on
extending the benefits to all , COM(2004) 383 final, Rapporteurs: Mr Etty and Mrs Hornung-Draus,
Rex/182, at para 1.5 (Feb. 23, 2005) (referring to “the findings of the World Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalisation (WCSDG) that market-opening measures and financial and economic
considerations have predominated, neglecting their social consequences so far and that these rules and
policies are the outcome of a system of global governance insufficiently responsive to the interests and
needs of the less powerful players”)
30 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 104 (2000)
(describing how central bank governors established what is now the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision in response to the failures of the Herstaat Bank and Franklin National Bank in 1974). 
31 IOSCO is the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, a forum for co-ordinating
approaches to securities regulation. IOSCO’s web site is at http://www.iosco.org . For a discussion of 
IOSCO’s Principles of Securities Regulation see, e.g., Katherina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and
Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 116-120 (2002) 
32 The OECD has addressed issues of financial regulation and governance. See, e.g., OECD,
OECD Guidelines for Insurers’ Governance, (April 28, 2005)  available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/10/34799740.pdf ; OECD, OECD Guidelines for Pension Fund
Governance, (April 28, 2005)  available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/52/34799965.pdf ; OECD,
White Paper on Governance of Collective Investment Schemes, 88 Financial Market Trends 137 (March
2005) available at  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/10/34572343.pdf
33
 IAIS is the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, which is a co-operative
organisation of insurance supervisors. The IAIS website is at http://www.iaisweb.org .
10
affect the development of the rules. Large well-resourced organisations adopt complex
strategies of working together and separately in order to maximise the effectiveness of
their voices. Smaller firms’ and investors’ and depositors’ voices may be lost in the
hubbub around rule-making created by larger firms and their trade associations.29
2.1 TRANSNATIONAL RULE-MAKING 
Transnational standards setting bodies such as the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision,30 IOSCO,31 the OECD,32 and the IAIS33 involve technocratic networks of
regulators from different states working together to develop harmonised standards for
banking, securities and insurance regulation. Other principles which affect financial
firms relating to money laundering and terrorist financing controls are developed by the
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34 See, e.g., Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report for 2003-4, 3 (Jul.
2, 2004) available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/12/44/33622501.PDF . The FATF has adopted
forty recommendations on money laundering and nine special recommendations on terrorist financing.
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The 40 Recommendations (June 20, 2003) available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/38/47/34030579.PDF ; Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, (Oct. 31, 2001 ) available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/16/34266142.pdf; Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering,
Detecting and Preventing the Cross-border Transportation of Cash by Terrorists and Other Criminals,
International Best Practices, (Feb 12, 2005) available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/50/63/34424128.pdf . 
35 See, e.g., Power without Accountability, note 23 above at v (noting that the Basle Committee is
“made up of a few privileged BIS members, located within the BIS but not ultimately accountable to it and
its fifty members.”) 
36 Cf. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 2-3 IILJ
Working Paper 2004/6 (Global Administrative Law Series) (www.iilj.org) available from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=692764  (Noting the non-participation of developing
countries in supranational financial rule-making).
37 Cf. EU Commission, Communication from the Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of
consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested
parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final at 10 (Dec. 11, 2002) available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0704en01.pdf  (“the Commission
remains convinced that a legally-binding approach to consultation is to be avoided, for two reasons: First,
a clear dividing line must be drawn between consultations launched on the Commission’s own initiative
prior to the adoption of a proposal, and the subsequent formalised and compulsory decisionmaking
process according to the Treaties. Second, a situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal
could be challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of interested parties. Such
an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible with the need for timely delivery of policy, and with the
expectations of the citizens that the European Institutions should deliver on substance rather than
concentrating on procedures.”)
11
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a body established by the G7 nations in 1989.34
By definition such inter-governmental bodies operate at a distance from national
democratic processes. The Basle Committee, the OECD, and the FATF are bodies with
limited memberships, composed of representatives from a relatively small number of
states.35  Even IOSCO and IAIS which have more inclusive membership arrangements
tend to be dominated by members from northern, economically developed states.36 The
actions of these supranational standard-setters are not subject to the sort of controls
that apply to domestic administrative agencies. Firms and people who may be affected
by their pronouncements do not have opportunities to challenge these pronouncements
in court. 37
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38 On the IMF’s Standards and Codes Initiative see, e.g.,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sc.htm. See also, e.g., Alastair Clark, International Standards and
Codes, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 162 ( Dec. 2000) available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/fsr/fsr09art7.pdf
39 Although members of the IMF have an obligation under Article IV of the IMF Articles of
Agreement “to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates”.
40 For example, US banking regulators and the New Basle Accord. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Joint Press  Release, Banking Agencies To Perform Additional
Analysis Before Issuing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Related To Basel II (Apr. 29, 2005) available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/scripts/newsrelease.aspx?JNR=1&Doc=KLDCDKRC.xml 
41 The EU and the US are discussing enhanced regulatory co-operation. See, e.g., EU
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
12
The IMF and the World Bank encourage states to comply with the standards that
bodies such as the FATF, the Basle Committee and IOSCO produce,38 so that the
standards may have significant practical impact although they are not formally binding.39
On the other hand, standards established by the FATF, the Basle Committee or IOSCO
will typically produce a direct impact on firms only when they are implemented within a
domestic regulatory system. A domestic regulator is subject to the rules that normally
apply to administrative action within its domestic system when it considers how to
implement supranational rules domestically. However, whether because of urging by
the IFIs or by financial firms, rules developed in transnational standard setting bodies
may benefit from a presumption of acceptability when they are considered by a
domestic legislator or regulator. And it is probably easier for regulators from the
countries that make most of the international standards than for regulators from the
countries that do not to decide to adjust the standards for domestic conditions.40 Thus it
is possible that people and firms who did not participate in consultations by the
international standard setting organisations may have more opportunity to express their
views on a proposed domestic implementation in some countries (the more powerful
countries) than in others.
The EU’s programme for developing harmonised financial regulation differs from
the activities of the Basle Committee and IOSCO in a number of ways.41 First, the EU’s
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European Economic and Social Committee - a Stronger EU-US Partnership and a More Open Market for
the 21st Century, COM (2005) 196, (May 18, 2005).
42 The EU’s harmonization measures are now separated into framework measures and more
detailed implementing measures. The idea is that the more detailed implementing rules could be changed
more easily thus ensuring that the rules could adjust to changing circumstances. This new arrangement
was introduced after the Lamfalussy Report. See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the
Regulation of European Securities Markets, (Feb. 15, 2001) available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/lamfalussyen.pdf (Lamfalussy Report).
43 See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, The Listing Review and Implementation of the
Prospectus Directive, Consultative Paper 04/16, 12, ¶ 2.6 (October 2004) available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp04_16.pdf (noting that FSA was consulting in relation to areas where
FSA had discretion in implementation of directive).
44 See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the final report of the Committee of Wise Men on
the regulation of European securities markets, available at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/lamfalussy_process/ep_position/b5_173_2001.pdf
45 The EU’s democratic deficit has been noted since the early days. The EU is more democratic in
its processes than it was, and more democratic than other international organizations.
46 The FATF website is at http://www.fatf-gafi.org
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harmonised rules are binding on the EU Member States.42 Member States may not
have much discretion about how they go about implementing the rules agreed in EU
directives.43 In addition, the EU Parliament has, and exercises, the right to be involved
in the development of the EU’s harmonised rules for financial regulation.44 Thus the
EU’s measures have more of the quality of bindingness, and more democratic input,
than harmonised rules or principles developed in other fora.45
International and regional organisations which develop rules and standards for
international financial activity have recently been taking steps to enhance the
transparency of their processes. The FATF may be distinguished from other financial
standard setters because although it publicises its work through its website, it does not
use the website to seek public comments on its work.46 The development of money-
laundering and terrorist financing controls is treated as an aspect of law enforcement
rather than as an aspect of financial regulation even though much of the burden of
implementing the resulting rules is borne by financial firms. As money-laundering and
terrorist financing control is an enterprise of law enforcement the expertise which is
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47 See, e.g., FATF Annual Report for 2003-4, note 34 above, at 3 (‘The delegations of the Task
Force’s members are drawn from a wide range of disciplines, including experts from the Ministries of
Finance, Justice, Interior and External Affairs, financial regulatory authorities and law enforcement
agencies.’)
48 See, e.g., International Securities Market Association, International Primary Market Association,
Danish Securities Dealers Association, London Investment Banking Association, Swedish Securities
Dealers Association, Public comments by the above associations on IOSCO’s Consultation Report on
Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD177_25.pdf (“We also recognise that publication of the Code
for consultation is part of IOSCO’s evolving policy of greater public consultation, the objectives of which,
as set out in IOSCO’s recent draft Statement of Consultation Policy, we endorse and on which we will
comment in due course.”)
49 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, US Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?,
(forthcoming) 68 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 7 (2005) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=723147
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valued in the process of developing standards is law enforcement and regulatory
expertise rather than financial sector expertise.47
In contrast to the FATF, the Basle Committee, IOSCO and the IAIS all publish
documents including  their proposed rules and standards through their web pages in
order to publicise their work and also to invite public comment. Financial trade
associations welcome moves to greater public consultation.48 However, although some 
international standard setters have worked to increase the transparency of their
processes there is as yet no one method of encouraging public participation, or even of
describing the results of a consultation exercise. This is not surprising given that
domestic rules regulating the rule-making activities of regulatory agencies vary, and the
international standard setters include members from different jurisdictions with different
approaches to administrative procedure.  A growing literature focuses on examining
and critiquing administrative procedures for global governance, 49 but there is as yet no
global standard for supranational administrative procedures. 
Documents on very technical subjects may produce limited numbers of
comments. For example, when the Basle Committee sought information and views on
credit risk modelling it received twenty-two responses. Of these responses nine were
“from individual banks or industry associations, five from academics or academic
organisations and five from representatives of the consulting, accounting or risk
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50 See, e.g., Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Summary of Responses Received on the
Report “Credit Risk Modelling: Current Practices and Applications” 1 (May 2000) available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs71.pdf
51 See, e.g., IOSCO Technical Committee, Principles on Outsourcing of Financial Services for
Market Intermediaries, Notice of Final Report, Survey and Summary of Comments, (Feb. 2005) available
at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD186.pdf . Such an approach is consistent with the view that
in the context of regulatory processes it is the ideas, rather than their level of support, which matter.
52 See, e.g., Public Comments on Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies,
available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD177.pdf
53 http://www.bis.org/about/factbcbs.htm
54 See, e.g., Philippe Richard, IOSCO Secretary General, Report, in IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT FOR
2003, 18  available at http://www.iosco.org/annual_report/pdf/IOSCO_Annual_Report_03.pdf (“With its
year end membership of 171 agencies, IOSCO is very representative of the international community of
securities regulators and fully assumes its responsibility of international standard setter for securities
market.”)
55 In a jurisdiction where there is no governmental regulatory body an SRO may be allowed to
become an ordinary member of IOSCO. See IOSCO Annual Report for 2003, note 54 above, at 29.
56 See, e.g., Philippe Richard, note 54 above at 18 (“IOSCO also has a very active SRO
Consultative Committee, which provides important and constant input from the industry.”)
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management professions.”50  This Summary of Responses does not name any of the
respondents. In some cases it may be difficult to discern from the standard setter’s
description of the results of consultations not only who commented on a publication or
proposal but even how many people and firms commented.51 In other cases the
standard setter may publish the text of comments received on its web pages.52
The Basle Committee’s work is carried out by representatives of banking
regulators and central banks from the G10 countries.53 IOSCO has a much larger,54
tripartite, membership, including Ordinary members, Associate members and Affiliate
members. IOSCO’s ordinary members are securities regulators.55  Only ordinary
members have the right to vote, although Associate members participate in IOSCO’s
President’s Committee and Affiliate members which are SROs participate in IOSCO’s
SRO Consultative Committee.56 The Associate members and Affiliate members
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57 In 2003 IOSCO incurred a loss of 291,579 euro. See IOSCO Annual Report for 2003, note 54
above, at 32. A number of IOSCO members have been in arrears with their membership fees. See, e.g.,
Philippe Richard, note 54 above at 18 (“At the end of 2003 outstanding membership fees of more than
one year stood at slightly over 50 000 Euros. The Presidents Committee unfortunately had to aggravate, in
accordance with Part 12 of the By-Laws, a sanction imposed to the Comision Nacional de Valores of
Paraguay (CNVP) for repeated failure to pay its prescribed annual financial contribution. The IOSCO
membership of the CNVP was therefore suspended. The Superintendencia de Valores of Colombia is also
currently the object of a Presidents Committee sanction for similar reasons. Its voting right was suspended
in 2002 and that situation continued in 2003.”) The IAIS also incurred a loss in 2003. IAIS Annual Report
for 2003 note 59 at 16.
58 General Information on IOSCO,  IOSCO Annual Report for 2003, note 54 above, at 26.  The
SRO Consultative Committee works with IOSCO’s Technical Committee. See id. (“The SRO Consultative
Committee has designated contact persons with the Technical Committee Standing Committees and
Project Teams and is therefore able to provide substantive input related to their regulatory initiatives.”)
59 IAIS Annual Report for 2003, iv (Sept. 2004) available at 
http://www.iaisweb.org/041019_Annual_report_2003.pdf
60 See, e.g., IAIS Annual Report for 2003, note 59 above at iv (“more than 70 organisations and
individuals are observers. They represent professional associations, insurance and reinsurance
companies, international financial institutions, consultants and other professionals.”)
61 See, e.g., IAIS Annual Report for 2003, note 59 above at 8 (“During the year the Technical
Committee working parties have continued to receive substantial support from IAIS observers. They have
been generous in providing input and comments on a range of issues when requested and respectful of
supervisory concerns. Each working party has developed a unique relationship with the observer
community that suits both its needs and operating style. This partnership has been productive and has
served to improve the quality and relevance of the output.”)
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contribute through their membership fees to IOSCO’s finances.57 IOSCO’s affiliate
members include financial exchanges, non-exchange SROs and international
organisations. IOSCO says that it:
recognizes the importance of maintaining a close dialogue with the SROs
and international organizations that make up its affiliate membership and
of allowing them to make a constructive input in the work of the
Organization58
The IAIS also has a large membership, including insurance supervisors and regulators
from over a hundred and sixty jurisdictions in its membership.59 The IAIS also has a
special membership category for “Observers” which includes private sector entities.60
The IAIS seeks to involve observers in the work of its Technical Committee.61 IAIS
observers generate significant amounts of revenue for IAIS which may be important
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62 In 2003 observer membership fees were $355,000 and members fees were $655,000. IAIS
Annual Report for 2003, note 59 above, at 16. See also Report from Chair of the Budget Committee, id. at
13. 
63
 In 2001 the BIS decided at an Extraordinary General Meeting that it should be owned only by
central banks and that it would mandatorily repurchase its shares in private ownership. See BIS,
Withdrawal of all shares of the Bank for International Settlements held by private shareholders, (Oct.13,
2003) available at http://www.bis.org/about/shareswd.htm On a challenge by some of the private owners
the mandatory repurchase was found to be lawful by an arbitral tribunal. Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Arbitral Tribunal established pursuant to Article XV of the Agreement signed at the Hague on 20 January
1930, Partial Award on the Lawfulness of the Recall of the Privately Held Shares on 8 January 2001 and
the Applicable Standards for valuation of those Shares, (Nov. 22, 2002) available at 
http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/BIS/EPA.pdf
64 See note 62 above. 
65 See, e.g., McCreevy, note 12 above (“the standard setters are currently sponsored by voluntary
contributions from contributors ranging from central banks to listed companies, which raises potential
issues of conflict of interest. I therefore welcome the Board of Trustees of the IASB’s intention to change
this.”)
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given that the organisation has suffered from a mismatch between revenues in US
dollars and expenses in Swiss francs in recent years.62
In contrast to the Basle Committee, which does not depend on the private sector
for its financing,63 both IOSCO and the IAIS are partly dependent on financing from
non-governmental entities which participate in their standard setting processes. In the
case of IOSCO the non-governmental entities are SROs, so perform combined
functions of regulation and member interest representation. In the case of IAIS the non-
governmental members include insurance companies accounting firms and law firms.
IOSCO’s accounts do not identify the relative contributions of SRO and governmental
members, but IAIS’s accounts show that it benefits financially from the participation of
non-governmental entities in its membership.64  The International Financial Standards
Board (which is a non-governmental entity rather than an inter-governmental or inter-
regulatory entity) has been criticised on the basis that its reliance on private sector
financial resources might create conflicts of interest.65
Consultation procedures may be more or less formalised and/or theorised.
Whereas the Basle Committee has not articulated in any formal way what principles it
applies in the context of its consultations with interested parties, in November 2004
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66 IOSCO, Consultation Policy and Procedures, Draft for Public Consultation (Nov. 2004)
available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD175.pdf
67 IOSCO, Consultation Policy, supra note 66 at 2.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 4.
71 IOSCO, Public Comments Received on Iosco’s Draft Consultation
Policy and Procedures (Feb. 2005) available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD191.pdf
72 See, e.g., id at 5, 8, 15
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IOSCO published a consultation document about its consultation procedures.66
IOSCO’s draft document on consultation policy suggested that IOSCO was concerned
with a broadly defined group of interests. In describing its objectives in consulting
IOSCO said that it wanted:
To benefit from the expertise of market intermediaries, exchanges and
other market operators, securities clearing and settlement system service
providers, endusers and consumers, auditors and auditing companies,
and other public authorities, international standard setters, international
financial institutions, and regional development banks, when assessing
and analyzing regulatory issues.67
IOSCO’s draft also described the advantages IOSCO saw in increasing the
transparency of its operations as being “to enhance the perceived fairness and
openness of IOSCO's decision-making process and the visibility and acceptability of its
results”.68 IOSCO also suggested that it has an interest in ensuring consistent
approaches to common concerns.69 The document suggested that IOSCO would
usually publish comments in an anonymous format on its website.70 In February 2005
IOSCO published the full text of nine comments on this consultation document.71
Commenters asked for more information about IOSCO’s priorities and agenda,72 more
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73 See, e.g., id at 8, 23-24.
74 See, e.g., Comments of the International Council of Securities Associations, id at 11 (“The
period prior to a formal consultation is a critical and often underappreciated stage in the consultation
process. Therefore, we urge IOSCO to place greater stress on consulting with market participants and
other informed parties prior to beginning work on a consultation document in order to determine the need
for regulatory action and, if such a need exists, what action would be appropriate. Contacts with market
participants and other informed parties during this preparatory phase would help focus the debate on the
most important and material issues.”)
75 Id. at 18.
76 IOSCO, Report of the Executive Committee of IOSCO, IOSCO Consultation Policy And
Procedure, (April 2005) available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD197.pdf
77 See supra text at note 67.
78 IOSCO, Executive Committee Report, supra note 76 at 2.
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time to react to IOSCO’s proposals,73 and opportunities to be involved in discussing
ideas before a formal consultation.74  The International Bar Association argued that
IOSCO should not publish comments anonymously:
we submit that IOSCO should not permit any consultations to take place
with comments which are anonymous to the public. We understand that
internal regulatory deliberations must and should be confidential. Once
any proposal is posted for consultation, however, all comments, both
formal and informal, should be made in full transparency with attribution,
and the extent to which IOSCO is meeting with or receiving information
from interested companies, lobbyists or groups should be apparent to all.
We therefore recommend that all submissions after the publication of the
consultation should be public and easily accessible.75
In April 2005 IOSCO published a Report on its Consultation Policy and Procedure.76
Strikingly, while the November 2004 draft referred to IOSCO’s interest in benefitting
from the expertise of a wide range of potential consultees, including consumers,77 the
April 2005 Report refers merely to its objective of benefitting from “the expertise of the
international financial community.”78 Although the Report refers more than once to the
“public”, the word “consumer” appears nowhere. The April Report also suggests that
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79 IOSCO, Executive Committee Report, supra note 76 at 4.
80 IOSCO, Executive Committee Report, supra note 76 at 4.
81 A Business Test Panel was originally established as a pilot project in 1998. See DG Internal
Market, EU Commission, Evaluation of the European Business Test Panel (2002) available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/internal_market/evaluation/2002-ebtp_en.htm  See also, e.g.,  Charlie
McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Better regulation and the financial
services sector, 3 (Jun. 21, 2005) available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission_barroso/mccreevy/docs/speeches/2005-06-21/regulation_en.pdf
(“We have also developed interactive tools such as the European Business Test Panel. It allows us to
consult directly more than 3.000 businesses across the EU.”)
82 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC OJ
No. L 145/1 (Apr. 30, 2004) available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_145/l_14520040430en00010044.pdf .
83 Council Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field, O.J. No. L 141/27
(1993).
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IOSCO will consider engaging in “pre-consultations”,79 and that comments will be
published unless “anonymity is specifically required.”80
The EU adopts binding rules of financial regulation as directives. Under the
Lamfalussy approach EU financial regulation directives should be framework measures,
and the detailed implementing rules should be adopted through a comitology procedure
involving CESR. The EU’s legislative process takes account of the views of civil society
through the participation of the Economic and Social Committee. The EU Commission
has been making consistent efforts to ensure that the views of businesses in particular
are taken into account in the regulatory process by setting up a European Business
Test Panel.81
In theory the EU directives should set the general framework within which the
EU’s detailed implementing rules should operate. The EU’s legislative process for
producing the framework directives is often a lengthy one involving many opportunities
for interested parties to express their views on proposals. For example, the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive which was adopted in 200482 replaces the Investment
Services Directive of 1993.83 In 2000 the Commission published a Communication on
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84 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Upgrading
the investment services directive (93/22/EEC) COM/2000/0729 final, 23-24 (Nov. 15, 2000).
85 ISD Feedback Synthesis of Responses to COM(2000)729, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/revision-isd/isd-feedback-reponse_en.pdf 
86 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/isd/revision_en.htm#doc 
87 Revision of the Investment Services Directive (93/22) Summary of Responses to the
Preliminary Orientations of Commission Services (July 2001) 2,  available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/2001-07-summ_responses.pdf
88 By the time the second consultation was announced the Commission said it had received 77
responses to the July 2001 consultation. DG Internatl Market, EU Commission, Revision of Investment
Services Directive, Second Consultation, Overview Paper, 2 available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/2nd-overview-paper_en.pdf
89 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Investment Services
and Regulated Markets, and Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, Council Directive 93/6/EEC and
European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC , COM (2002 ) 625 final, 7 (Nov. 19, 2002)
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/com2002_0625en01.pdf  (“The present proposal
has been drafted on the basis of a careful consideration of the 107 responses to these revised
orientations.”)
90 EU Commission, Formal Request for Technical Advice on Possible Implementing Measures on
the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (Directive 2004/39/EC) (June 25, 2004) available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/cesr/final-mandate-isd_en.pdf . This formal
request was preceded by a provisional mandate in January 2004.
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revising the Investment Services Directive in which it sought comments on a number of
issues.84 Forty-two respondents, including regulators and market participants
commented on this Communication.85 The Commission followed up with a larger
consultation exercise including an open hearing.86 This second consultation produced
69 comments almost entirely from market participants and regulators with one comment
from the “shareholder/investor” constituency.87 The Commission’s descriptions of the
comments do not identify commentators by name and do not generally identify
particular comments with particular categories of respondent. A second consultation
took place in 2002, 88 and a proposed directive was published in November 2002.89
Soon after the MiFID was adopted in 2004 the Commission asked CESR to provide
advice on possible implementing measures.90 The Commission does not necessarily
follow all of CESR’s recommendations in making proposals for measures to implement
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91 See, e.g., European Commission, Working document ESC/18/2005. Explanatory note: Main
differences between working document ESC/ 17/2005 andthe CESR level 2 advice (May 13, 2005)
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/isd/dir-2004-39-implement/esc-17-2005-explan
atory_en.pdf
92 CESR, the Committee of European Securities Regulators, was established by Commission
Decision 2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, OJ
No. L 191/43 (Jul. 13, 2001) available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_191/l_19120010713en00430044.pdf . CESR should “serve
as an independent body for reflection, debate and advice for the Commission in the securities field”. Id. at
Recital no. 8. It also has a role in encouraging implementation of EU securities measures. CESR is
composed of representatives of securities regulators from the Member States.
93 See, e.g., EU Commission, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue, supra
note 37 at 5 (“By fulfilling its duty to consult, the Commission ensures that its proposals are technically
viable, practically workable and based on a bottom-up approach. In other words, good consultation serves
a dual purpose by helping to improve the quality of the policy outcome and at the same time enhancing
the involvement of interested parties and the public at large. A further advantage is that transparent and
coherent consultation processes run by the Commission not only allow the general public to be more
involved, they also give the legislature greater scope for scrutinising the Commission’s activities (e.g. by
making available documents summarising the outcome of the consultation process).”)
94 Charter of the Committee of European Securities Regulators at para. 5.10.
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the level 1 directives.91
Unlike the Basle Committee, IOSCO and the IAIS, the EU’s CESR92 operates in
the context of a legal framework where participants have developed expectations about
consultation.93 CESR’s Charter states that:
The Committee will use the appropriate processes to consult (both
ex-ante and ex-post) market participants, consumers and end users which
may include inter alia: concept releases, consultative papers, public
hearings and roundtables, written and Internet consultations, public
disclosure and summary of comments, national and/or European focused
consultations. The Committee will make a public statement of its
consultation practices.94
The Charter also states that:
For the purpose of facilitating the dialogue with market participants,
consumers and other end users of financial services, the Committee will
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95 Id. at para 5.11.
96 CESR has a Market Participants Consultative Panel. The Committee of European Banking
Supervisors has established a Consultative Panel of representatives of market participants to act as a
sounding board. 
97 Committee of European Securities regulators, MiFID Consumer Day – 22 March 2005 Issues
on regulation of intermediaries and markets under MiFID “Summary of the main conclusions” 1 (May 16,
2005).
98 Id.
99 The prospectus directive’s reference to a “language customary in the sphere of international
finance” is generally understood at least to include English. Directive 2003/71/EC of the European
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establish working consultative groups, whenever appropriate.95
Rather than merely inviting comments on its proposals, CESR involves market
participants in its formal processes through a committee of market representatives.96 In
addition, CESR has established a number of Expert Groups on the various issues it is
responsible for. There are three Expert groups for the MiFID, which focus on market
transparency, intermediaries and co-operation and enforcement. CESR has not as yet
established a committee of consumer representatives, although in May 2005 CESR
held a “Consumer Day” on the MiFID and acknowledged the need to interact with
consumer groups in future:
The importance CESR attaches to receiving comments on its advice from
representatives of retail clients and consumers was stressed and CESR
expressed its concern that the responses received to previous
consultations carried out on MiFID, had not reflected sufficiently this set of
stakeholders. CESR made it known that it intended to organise similar
meetings in the future to continue and develop this dialogue further.97
The consumer groups which attended this meeting pointed out that they did not
necessarily have the resources in terms of knowledge and staff to be able to prepare
“considered responses” to consultations. They also suggested that it would be helpful if
consultation papers were more “reader-friendly” and if they were translated from
English into the different national languages.98 English is the dominant language in the
international financial markets,99 but financial regulation does not only affect
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Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public
or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ L 345/64, Art. 19(2) (Dec. 31, 2003)
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_345/l_34520031231en00640089.pdf 
100 Regulation No. 1 of 1958, as amended. All EU residents have the right to communicate with
the institutions in their own language (which is an EU official language). This language policy has been
subject to stress as a result of enlargement. See, e.g., Directorate-General for Translation of the
European Commission, Translating for a Multi-Lingual Community, 3 (March 2005) available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/translation/bookshelf/brochure_en.pdf (“In the interests of
cost-effectiveness, the Commission conducts its internal business in English, French and German, going
fully multilingual only when it communicates with the other EU institutions, the Member States and the
public.”)
101 See http://www.cesr-eu.org/
102 See, e.g., International Securities Market Association, International Primary Market
Association, Association of Norwegian Stockbroking Companies, Bankers and Securities Dealers
Association of Iceland, Danish Securities Dealers Association, Finnish Association of Securities Dealers,
London Investment Banking Association, Swedish Securities Dealers Association, The Bond Market
Association, Response to CESR’s Consultation on its October 2004 Preliminary Progress Report “Which
Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Markets?” The “Himalaya” Report (Jan. 25, 2005) available at 
http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/CESRHimalayaresponsefinal.pdf
103 See, e.g., id. at 3 (“We have seen, and support, ISDA’s response to the consultation.”)
104 See, e.g., Ending corporate privileges and secrecy around lobbying in the European Union, 
available at http://www.corporateeurope.org/docs/alter-eu.pdf
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professional market participants. Publishing consultation papers only in English tends to
favour people in the UK, and members of the elite who either read English or can afford
to pay for translators. That CESR operates in English is particularly unusual in the
context of the EU, which from the very early days was committed to the principle that
citizens should be able to communicate with the institutions in their own language.100
CESR publishes comments on its proposals on its website.101 Financial firms and
their trade associations are active commenters on CESR’s proposals. Trade
associations may file joint comments on CESR proposals,102 and they may refer to each
other’s comments in their own responses.103 Consumers and consumer organisations
do not have the resources of time or expertise to participate as effectively in
consultations. Europeans have expressed concern about a lack of transparency in the
EU’s governance,104 and Siim Kallas, the Commissioner for Administrative Affairs, Audit
and Anti-Fraud announced an EU Transparency Initiative in March 2005, although the
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105 Siim Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for
Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud, The need for a European transparency initiative,
Speech/05/130 at The European Foundation for Management, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham
(Mar. 3, 2005).
106 Committee of European Securities Regulators, Public Statement of Consultation Practices
(Dec. 2001)
107 Securities Industry Association, Re: CESR Draft Statement on Consultation Practices, 1 (Nov.
19, 2001) available at http://www.sia.com/2001_comment_letters/pdf/CESR.pdf
108 Id. at 3. 
109 See, e.g., Bond Markets News Bulletin (March 2, 2005) available at
http://www.bondmarket.com/newsletters/2005/20050302.htm
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promised White Paper has not yet been published.105
The financial firms and trade associations which comment on CESR’s proposals
are not limited to firms and trade associations from the EU Member States. Rather,
multinational firms and trade associations which represent such firms also comment on
CESR’s proposals reflecting the international characteristics of financial activity. For
example, when CESR issued its Statement on Consultation Practices in 2001106 the
Securities Industry Association commented that it was “supportive of CESR’s proposed
“Consultation Practices” as an excellent first step towards implementing a fully effective
consultation process... such a process best serves all market participants, and is the
foundation for deep, liquid and efficient markets.”107 The SIA urged CESR to consult not
just at the EU level but also at the international level.108 Financial trade associations
based in the US seek to inform their members about developments outside the US. The
Bond Market Association’s News Bulletins regularly inform its members about
regulatory initiatives in the EU as well as in the US.109 In April 2005 the Bond Market
Association, the IPMA and the ISMA announced that they would integrate their
European activities in the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) in order “to
ensure consistent and coordinated global representation of the capital markets and to
fully leverage the respective associations’ resources and expertise in support of their
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110 The Bond Market Association (BMA), the International Securities Market Association (ISMA)
and the International Primary Market Association (IPMA) Press Release, European Capital Markets Trade
Associations Global Partnership to be Established (Apr. 20, 2005) available at 
http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/200405%20PRESS%20RELEASE%20WITH%20BMA.PDF. This
announcement followed an announcement in February 2005 that the IPMA and the ISMA would merge.
International Primary Market Association (IPMA) and the International Securities Market Association
(ISMA) Press Release, IPMA and ISMA Announce Merger (Feb 3, 2005) available at 
http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/PRESS%20%20RELEASE%20FINAL%20030205.PDF 
111 See, e.g., SIA, Comments on the Draft ESCB-CESR Standards for Securities Clearing and
Settlement Systems in the European Union of May 2004, 3 (Aug. 3, 2004) available at
http://www.sia.com/2004_comment_letters/2837.pdf (“In marked contrast to reactions of the banking
community in Europe to the ESCB-CESR Standards, U.S. banking institutions were broadly supportive of
the Interagency White Paper recommendations. The reasons for this are clear. In their approach, U.S.
regulators did not attempt to impose additional regulations on firms considered to play significant roles in
critical markets. Rather, they tried to ensure the promulgation of best practices, used market-led initiatives
to ensure a robust communications infrastructure, and fostered competition as a means to reduce
concentration of risks. We believe a combination of these approaches in Europe would not only fulfil the
objective of risk reduction, but also benefit market participants by avoiding the cost of excessive
regulation, preserving choice, and encouraging innovation.” 
112 See, e.g., Centre for European Policy Studies, Prospectus for CEPS Task Force on EU
Financial Regulation and Supervision Beyond 2005 An Agenda for the New Commission, 2  available at 
http://ceps01.link.be/files/ProspectusBeyond2005.pdf#search='eu%20parliament%20and%20financial%20
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members.”110
The increasing amount of international harmonisation of standards for the
financial markets is in part a response to concerns about how divergent approaches to
regulation may interfere with cross-border financial activity. However, harmonisation
occurs in different fora, in regional organisations and in international organisations.
International banking organizations need to focus not only on the Basle committee’s
work on capital adequacy, but on the EU’s implementation of the Basle standards (in
addition to domestic implementation in the different jurisdictions where they are
licensed). Some lobbying energy is focused on persuading harmonisers to use the
same approaches to particular issues that have been adopted elsewhere. For example,
In commenting on CESR proposals the SIA has urged CESR to copy the approach of
US regulators.111
In the context of the EU, some commentators have suggested that market
participants like a situation where rule-making is centralised so that they can focus their
lobbying efforts.112  Thus financial firms might prefer not to have to deal with CESR as
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regulation' (“while market practitioners often preach the virtues of delegation, most appear more
comfortable of their capacity to ensure suitable outcomes if legislative power is kept at level 1. In short,
while there is a general agreement that delegation is important, all have significant interests in keeping
detailed rule-making power at the centre.”)
113 See, e.g., Helen Banks, It’s only just begun..., APCIMS QREVIEW 13 (Spring 2005) available at
http://www.apcims.org/public/publications/qreview/Spring%202005.pdf (“APCIMS continues to work in
cooperation with trade associations representing investment firms within ten European countries, to try
and improve the position for this sector.”)
114 See, e.g., CEPS Prospectus, note 112 above, at 3 (“The extended comitology process and the
accompanying consultations place much demand on both market participants and member state
authorities in terms of manpower and time. As this is costly, are larger institutions better placed to
exercise influence? How can the influence of smaller institutions be ensured?”)
115 See, e.g., CEPS Prospectus, note 112 above, at 3 (“Some interests are better organised than
others. It is often noted that consumer associations are less present in the consultations and regulatory
game having surrounded many of the FSAP-measures. If correct, how can a consumer say be
stimulated?”)
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well as with the Commission.
Transnational standard setting creates needs for new trade associations, or at
least new jobs in existing trade associations. Trade associations need to co-ordinate
their actions with trade associations established in other jurisdictions for maximum
impact.113 Large multinational multi-function financial firms will belong to a number of
different trade associations, and may well make their own separate submissions as part
of consultation exercises. Smaller firms with fewer human and financial capital
resources have a quieter voice in the consultation process.114 But, consumer groups are
noticeably absent from many of the discussions about financial regulation, distanced
from the discussions by lack of resources and by lack of “expertise”.115
The practice of consultation and response in the context of supranational
financial standard-setting and rule-making contrasts dramatically with ideals of bottom-
up governance. Consultation processes which tend to exclude smaller firms and
consumers are less legitimate than those which are more inclusive. As well as being
less legitimate, such exclusive processes may produce different results from more
inclusive processes. Financial firms and their trade associations tend to argue against
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116 See, e.g., International Securities Market Association, International Primary Market
Association, Danish Securities Dealers Association, London Investment Banking Association, Swedish
Securities Dealers Association, Public comments by the above associations on IOSCO’s Consultation
Report on Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies, 2,  available at 
http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD177_25.pdf (One of the foundation stones of our discussions
with legislators and regulators and in our responses to various legislative and regulatory initiatives in
recent years has been our strong advocacy of the use of non-legislative measures unless there is
evidence of a market failure which industry participants are unable or unwilling to correct.”)
117 See, e.g., ISMA et al, note 102 above at 4 (“it is important to recognise that supervisors must
be accountable to national authorities who work within the international legal framework that is set up in a
process of full democratic accountability. Equally it is essential to recognise that it would not be practical or
desirable to submit every individual supervisory action to democratic scrutiny and legislative control. This
would also not be consistent with any drive towards deregulation.”)
118 See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, International Regulatory Outlook 2005, June Update
(Jun. 2005) available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/iro_2005/iro_2005_update.pdf
119 See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Joint Press Release, Banking Agencies Announce
Publication of Basel Accord Consultative Paper (Apr. 30, 2003) available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030430/
120 Participation in supranational processes may also affect domestic regulators’ actions at
home. Cf. Stephen Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 71 (2002) (“A central normative goal of transgovernmental regulatory cooperative
efforts is to create frameworks that conduce national regulators to reflexively take into account the impact
of their actions on affected, but otherwise unrepresented, foreign constituents, while remaining deferential
28
rules and for non-legislative measures,116 they will argue for certainty for themselves
(and sometimes this will mean less certainty for others), they will argue the costs of
regulation and the benefits of deregulation.117
2.2 DOMESTIC RULE-MAKING 
Domestic financial regulators sit, sometimes uncomfortably, between the
supranational bodies which produce international standards and regulated firms. This
may lead them to publish documents explaining their role in these international
networks.118  When domestic regulators work together in networks such as the Basle
Committee they may seek comments at home on proposals for harmonisation as they
would on purely domestic initiatives.119 Thus domestic consultation procedures,
involving market participants, may influence supranational regulatory initiatives.120 At
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to distinct national values and priorities.”)
121 See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, The Listing Review, supra note 43.
122 Comments of the International Bar Association on IOSCO Consultation Policy and Procedures
in IOSCO, Public Comments supra note 71 at 18.
123 Consumer groups could perhaps be more effective lobbyists in the context of domestic
regulatory initiatives than they are. See, e.g., Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks Before Women in Housing and Finance and The Exchequer Club, 7 (Jan.12, 2005) available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-1a.pdf (what seems to be absent in the dialogue with consumer
organizations is a discussion of the interplay of how to better inform consumers by disclosing better, but
not necessarily more, information, and the impact of regulatory disclosure burdens on banking institutions.
And why aren’t consumer organizations berating us to do consumer testing to find out what consumers
really want and think is important?”)
124 See http://www.fs-cp.org.uk/
125 See http://www.fs-pp.org.uk/
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other times domestic regulators seek comments on their proposed implementations of
supranational harmonised rules.121 But, as the International Bar Association has pointed
out, supranational standards may not benefit from as much discussion and consultation
at the domestic level as proposed standards which originate domestically:
It seems increasingly clear that the essential discussion of standards will
take place at the IOSCO level rather than later at the home country level
and that home country regulators will increasingly take the position that
the standards adopted by IOSCO foreclose further discussion in the home
country of the topics covered by these standards. This process is
legitimate in democratic rulemaking when, and only when, those same
principles have been fully vetted in a public manner at an international
level.122
Domestic consultations may generate responses from a wider range of
participants than consultations by supranational standard-setters.123 In part this is
because consultation procedures at the domestic level may be more inclusive than
consultation procedures at the supranational level. The UK’s Financial Services
Authority has a Consumer Panel124 and a Small Business Panel as well as a
Practitioner Panel.125 These structures contrast with CESR’s emphasis on ensuring only
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126 See, e,g., Financial Services Authority, note 118 above, at 11.
127 A number of political action committees operating in the US have foreign connections. For
example, the Credit Suisse First Boston PAC gave $377,250 to candidates for the US Congress and
Senate in the 2004 election cycle. http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strID=C00111559
128 SEC, Standards relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Red.  18788  (Apr. 16,
2003) available at 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2003/pdf/03-9157.pdf .
The EU-US Financial Markets Dialogue is an attempt to resolve issues like this for the future.
129 SEC, Foreign Bank Exemption from the Insider Lending Prohibition of Exchange Act Section
13(k), Exchange Act Release No. 34-49616, 69 Fed. Reg. 24016 (Apr. 30, 2004)
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the participation of market participants (and not the participation of consumers of
financial services) in its processes. The consumers’ interests are not ignored in the
context of CESR’s actions. For example, the Financial Services Authority says that it
takes account of the interests of consumers, in particular when it implements
international standards.126 However, if CESR itself does not take active steps to
encourage consumer participation the consumers’ voices are muted compared to
business voices and actions by domestic regulators in the process of implementing
supranational rules may not be adequate amplifiers of the silenced consumer voices.
Transnational financial activity increases the incentives for foreign firms to try to
influence domestic rulemaking through campaign contributions127 and commenting on
proposed domestic regulations. For example, in 2000 the US Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which applies to foreign firms whose securities are traded in the
US markets. The statute would have required some foreign companies to have audit
committees composed of independent directors, conflicting with requirements in their
home jurisdictions. After receiving more than 185 comments on the audit committee
independence proposal, the SEC adopted final rules which sought to accommodate the
difficulties of foreign issuers.128 The SEC has also adopted regulations specifying that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition on loans to directors, which under the provisions
of the statute were specified not to apply to insured depositary institutions in the US (a
term which could not apply to a foreign bank), would not apply to foreign banks.129 The
SEC has shown itself to be much more willing to work with regulators from other
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130 Commentators have sometimes suggested that the US “views free trade in securities as
everybody else abiding by American rules”. Barbara Stymiest, Towards the development of integrated
global markets: is mutual recognition the way forward?, Speech to the FESE Convention (June 12, 2003)
available at http://www.fese.be/efmc/2003/report/efmc_stymiest.htm
131 SEC Staff Likely to Recommend Rule To Ease Deregistration for Foreign Firms, 36 BNA Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. 2050 (Nov. 22, 2004). US issuers can deregister if there are  fewer than 300 “holders of
record’ of their securities” whereas foreign issuers can only deregister if they have fewer than 300
beneficial owners in the US.
132 Transatlantic Business Dialogue, supra note 20 at 20.
133 Cf. The Bond Market Association, Circular 230 - Impact of Section 10.35 on the U.S. Capital
Markets, (June 17, 2005) available at
http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/Circular_230_Comment_Letter.pdf  (“The U.S. capital markets
are recognized as the most efficient and liquid capital markets in the world. These attributes derive, in
part, from the established practices and expectations of the participants in these markets and also from
the ability of federal securities regulators to adapt the regulatory structure as needed to keep pace with the
evolution of capital markets practices. Issuers and investors view our capital markets as appropriately
balancing the competing interests of providing ready access to the markets while at the same time
affording investors with appropriate protections for their investments.”) Arguments about the impact of
regulation on competition are a feature of lobbying in the EU. See, e.g., APCIMS, "Group of eleven" seek
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jurisdictions than the US Congress, and than the SEC was itself only a few years
earlier.130 As commentators noticed that regulations make it easier for US issuers than
for foreign issuers to avoid the application of Sarbanes-Oxley regulations by
deregistering their securities SEC officials suggested that the SEC would make it easier
for foreign issuers to deregister their securities in the US.131
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its aftermath illustrate that
domestic legislatures may insensitive to the impact of domestic rules on multinational
businesses. Whereas Congress enacted a statute which imposed significant burdens
on foreign firms, the SEC has been responsive when these firms have raised their
concerns. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue has suggested that legislators from
Congress and the European Parliament should develop a dialogue to avoid such
problems for the future.132
Even where domestic rule-making proposals seem to affect domestic rather than
cross-border interests firms and their trade associations may argue that the proposals
threaten domestic financial markets (with the explicit or implicit suggestion that they
might lose business overseas).133
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urgent changes to new Capital Requirements Directive, (Apr. 18, 2005) available at
http://www.apcims.org/public/news/releases/2005/Changes%20to%20new%20Capital%20Requirements.a
sp (quoting Angela Knight, APCIMS’ Chief Executive as saying:“When eleven European trade
associations work together to lobby the EU Commission, you know something is fundamentally wrong!”)
134 In this section of the paper I contrast “regulation” and “contract”, but I also want to suggest that
contracts control behavior in ways that are similar to regulation. Cf. Alan Greenspan, Government
Regulation and Derivative Contracts, Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Coral Gables, Florida (Feb. 21, 1997) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/19970221.htm  (“no market is ever truly
unregulated. The self-interest of market participants generates private market regulation. Thus, the real
question is not whether a market should be regulated. Rather, the real question is whether government
intervention strengthens or weakens private regulation. If incentives for private market regulation are weak
or if market participants lack the capabilities to pursue their interests effectively, then the introduction of
government regulation may improve regulation. But if private market regulation is effective, then
government regulation is at best unnecessary.”)
135 See, e.g., Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, The Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer,
(March 2005) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint13.pdf
136 Cf. Guidelines for Insurers’ Governance, supra note 32 at 14 (“regulatory authorities must be
cautious not to impose highly restrictive rules and wide-ranging prohibitions that severely restrict the
discretionary powers of corporate executives.”)
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3.0  CONTRACTING
Transnational financial activity is accomplished through contracts. Contracts are
the core mechanism whereby the market regulates itself.134 The relationship between
contracts and (public) financial regulation in the international financial markets is
complex and multi-faceted. Contracts involve risks which regulators need to address in
the context of evaluating risks which may damage financial stability.135 At the same time
contracts may be used to limit or shift risks away from financial institutions. Regulations
may specify the contents of contracts or may preclude the inclusion of certain
provisions in contracts.136 This section of the paper addresses four themes in this
complex relationship between regulation and contracts: contracts are preferable to
regulation; contracts function as regulation; contracts constrain regulation; and
regulation constrains contracts.
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137 This preference is only one preference that financial firms articulate and in fact rational firms
would tend to prefer deregulation where rules interfere with their business and regulation where rules
would interfere with the business of their actual or potential competitors. Cf. Stigler, note 14 above, at 5
(“We propose the general hypothesis: every industry or occupation that has enough political power to
utilize the state will seek to control entry.”). A firm’s or trade group’s preference for competition-reducing
rules is not articulated as such but is articulated as a preference for consumer protection or market
integrity.
138 In some domestic jurisdictions, such as the US (“pre-packaged bankruptcies”),  bankruptcy
solutions are often negotiated solutions. A sovereign bankruptcy regime need not, therefore, be a
“regulatory” regime rather than a contractual regime. Opposition to the IMF SDRM proposals may suggest
more about market participants’ nervousness about the IMF’s likely approach to a sovereign bankruptcy
regime than about the idea of a sovereign bankruptcy regime as such.
139 See, e.g., Peter Krijgsman, A Brief History. IPMA’s Role in Harmonising
International Capital Markets1984 – 1994,  available at 
http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/History%20of%20IPMA.PDF  (“Originating as an offshore market, and not
subject to the exclusive regulation of one government or group of governments, Euro-securities initially
benefited from the exploitation of inefficiencies in individual domestic markets.”)
140 See, e.g., Michael Evans, Exchanges prepare to deregulate to protect Eurobond business,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW  (Apr. 2005)
141 See, e.g.,  Concord Trust v Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc [2005]UKHL 27 available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd050428/concor.pdf
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3.1 CONTRACTS ARE PREFERABLE TO REGULATION
Consistent with preferences for no regulation or for deregulation,137 financial
market participants will often argue that contracts can be used more effectively or as
effectively to achieve objectives for which regulatory solutions are proposed.138  The
euromarkets are often described as markets which came into existence offshore,
avoiding the impact of regulations which applied to domestic markets.139 In the early
days relationships in the euromarkets were governed by contract rather than by
regulation. Not only did market participants in the euromarkets avoid domestic
regulatory authorities, they also avoided courts. Increasingly over time participants in
the euromarkets have needed to worry more about the impact (and potential impact) of
regulation on their activities.140 And euromarket participants also now take their disputes
to court.141 A market which seemed 25 years ago to be essentially regulated by non-
legal norms is increasingly regulated through legal rules. Still, euromarket participants
work to carve out spaces for contract rather than regulation.
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142 See, e.g., IMF,  A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Preliminary Considerations,
(Nov. 30, 2001);   IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism—Further
Considerations, (Nov. 27, 2002) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.htm
143 See, e.g., Adam Lerrick and Allan H. Meltzer, Sovereign Default the Private Sector Can
Resolve Bankruptcy Without a Formal Court, Carnegie Mellon Quarterly International Economics Report,
April 2002, available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/bank.pdf . See also Report of the G-10 Working
Group on Contractual Clauses (Sep. 26, 2002) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf
144 See, e.g., Anne Krueger, IMF First Deputy Managing Director, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Messy or Messier?, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, January 4,
2003, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/010403.htm ; Report
of the G-10 Working Group, supra note 143 at 3 (“The view of the Working Group is that this clause is
perhaps the most critical component of the package that is being proposed, because it provides flexibility
in reaching agreement on the terms of a restructuring that debtors and creditors find to be in their
collective interest. At the same time, use of this clause could ensure that the rights of the supermajority
are respected and prevent a small minority of dissident creditors from pursuing disruptive litigation.”)
145 And vulture funds may buy distressed debt with a view to pursuing such claims. See, e.g.,
Elliott Associates, L.P. v The Republic of Panama 975 F. Supp. 332 (SDNY 1997); Elliott Associates, L.P.
v Banco De La Nacion 194 F.3d 363 (2d. Cir, 1999).
146 See, e.g., John Drage and Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses (Cacs): an
Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues (Summary), FINANCIAL STABILITY
REVIEW, 105, 105 (Dec. 2004) available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/fsr/fsr17art7.pdf
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Market participants have argued for contracts rather than regulation in the
context of sovereign debt. When officials at the IMF proposed to resolve problems
associated with sovereign debtors defaulting on their debt through the introduction of a
supranational equivalent to domestic bankruptcy proceedings,142 many commentators
and market participants argued that a contractual solution would be preferable to this
type of regulatory solution. Commentators argued that collective action clauses in bond
documentation could solve the problem of holdout creditors in sovereign debt issues
where the debtor is unable to meet all of its commitments.143 Collective action clauses
bind creditors to a restructuring agreed to by a specified percentage of creditors.144
Without such clauses holdout creditors may refuse to accept the terms of a
restructuring and demand payment in full of money owing to them.145 Although bonds
governed by New York Law had not traditionally contained collective action clauses,
more recently bond documentation for bonds issued by sovereigns subject to New York
law have tended to include collective action clauses.146 However, although collective
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147 See, e.g., Andrew G Haldane, Adrian Penalver, Victoria Saporta & Hyun Song Shin, Optimal
Collective Action Clause Thresholds, Bank of England Working Paper no. 249 (2004) available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/workingpapers/wp249.pdf
148 Robert Gray, Chairman International Primary Market Association, Collective Action Clauses:
the Way Forward 2-3 (Feb. 2004) available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/international/documents/Gray_000.pdf#search='collective%20action%20cl
auses'  (“The International Primary Market Association (IPMA) together with five other trade associations
(the “gang of six”) took the lead in developing marketable CACs suitable for inclusion in bond contracts
governed by both New York and English law.”) The “gang of six” was the Bond Market Association, the
Emerging Markets Creditors Association, EMTA, the International Primary Market Association, the
Institute of International Finance and the Securities Industry Association.
149 Emerging Markets Creditors’ Association, EMTA, Institute of International Finance,
International Primary Market Association, Securities Industry Association, The Bond Market Association,
Press Release, Financial Industry Leaders Announce Consensus on Crisis Management and Sovereign
Debt Restructuring. Market-Based Principles Agreed By Major Global Associations (Jun. 11, 2002)
available at 
http://www.ipma.org.uk/pdfs/2002,%2011%20June%20Joint%20Press%20Release%20on%20Sovereign
%20Debt%20Restructuring.PDF 
150
 Id. The press release also states: “Other private sector groups such as the EFFAS–European
Bond Commission have also expressed support for the private sector principles and fully endorse this
press release.” Id. 
151
 EMCA, Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues, (May 3, 2002) available at 
http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/model.pdf . See also http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/Final_merged.pdf
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action clauses now seem to be standard in sovereign bond issues, bondholder voting
thresholds vary.147
As part of the strategy of arguing against the SDRM and for collective action
clauses, a group of financial trade associations (which has been called the “gang of
six”)148 worked together to develop “a market-oriented process toward sovereign debt
restructuring based on contractual arrangements.”149 A participant in this process
commented on “the breadth of the private sector groups that have come together to
form this consensus.”150 The gang of six developed standard form collective action
clauses for inclusion in sovereign bond documentation.151
A contractual solution to the problem of holdout creditors has attractive features:
bondholders have notice when they invest that they are buying investments subject to
rules which assume collective action in response to issuers’ attempts to reschedule
debt, and they are, as a result, bound by these arrangements. Thus collective action
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152 See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 144 (“each bond issue would constitute a separate class and
CACs would thus not solve intercreditor equity concerns and collective action problems across bond
issues or between bonds and other creditors (most importantly banks)”). Although cf. Report of the G-10
Working Group, supra note 143 at 5-6 (“The Working Group believes that “aggregation” across a range of
different types of creditors for voting purposes under the majority amendment clause, while desirable, is
not practicable within a contractually based mechanism. However, it would appear to be legally and
contractually possible to have debt instruments issued pursuant to a single master agreement such as a
medium-term note programme providing for blended voting under certain circumstances. This approach
has a great deal of potential, especially within the context of bonds issued under the laws of a single
jurisdiction, and merits further exploration, as medium-term note programmes are increasingly used by
emerging market borrowers. It is noted, however, that the Working Group has not focused on the
technicalities of this approach in any detail.”)
153 See, e.g., Paul Bedford, Adrian Penalver & Chris Salmon, Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises:
the Market-based Approach and the Role of the IMF, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW (June 2005) available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2005/fsr18art5.pdf 
154 See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe:
Automation, Globalization and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON 497, 538 (2001) (“These are not rules
promulgated by a government agency, but by contractual arrangements among the participants. This
suggests that self-regulation has the ability to finesse the problems of national sovereignty and differing
legal systems that stand in the way of developing and enforcing common governmental regulatory
standards.”)
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clauses can help to ensure that no holders of a particular issue of bonds are treated
better than any other holders of that issue. However, contractual arrangements typically
bind only parties to the contracts. Thus collective action clauses in the documentation
for individual bond issues cannot produce a situation in which all creditors of a particular
issuer receive equal treatment.152 Moreover, just as all contracts operate in a legal
context which affects their viability, collective action clauses operate in the shadow of
the IMF’s actions.153
Although contracts do not bind non-parties they can create positive or negative
externalities for non-parties. A contract between a trade association and its members
may (or may not) mandate high standards of behaviour that will benefit the members’
customers. The same contracts may harm potential competitors who are excluded from
membership. 
These are some of the reasons for subjecting SROs to statutory controls. But
some commentators have pointed out that contracts operate across geographic
boundaries (and thus jurisdictional boundaries) in ways that regulation does not.154 The
IOSCO SRO Consultative Committee has argued that self-regulation is useful because it
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155 IOSCO SRO Consultative Committee, supra note 5.
156 See, e.g., Robert R. Glauber, CEO and President, NASD, Opening Remarks at NASD Fall
Securities Regulation Conference, San Francisco, California (Nov.17, 2000) available from
http://www.nasdr.com. See also NASD, NASD International Regulatory Services. Delivering Knowledge
and Experience Worldwide (2004) available at 
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/corp_comm/documents/home_page/nasdw_013328.pdf
157 Although cf. e.g.  Margaret Jane (Peggy) Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by
Machine, 160 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 1, 4   (2004)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=534042 (Suggesting ways in which that standardised contracts could be generally
effective without legal enforcement).
158 See, e.g., Office of Fair Trading, Competition in Professions (March 2001) available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/e2v5ybukef4g57rpmlzhbvfp6gpdazsj4f5vpx53aconsxbdktvaq2733uwk
wie3qtd74vdsasfaqhptaviksuzizra/oft328.pdf (analysing competition implications of the rules applying to
professions in the UK). Cf. US  v Visa USA, Inc. 344 F.3d 229 (2d. Cir 2003) (holding that rules adopted
by both Visa and Mastercard that merchants could not accept competing cards restricted competition and
harmed consumers).
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can transcend national boundaries in ways that law and administrative rules cannot.155 In
2000, Robert Glauber of the NASD announced a “new strategic initiative ... to offer ...
regulatory services to other exchanges and regulators, again both here in the U.S. and
abroad.”156 Ultimately contracts depend on the possibility of enforcement through state
processes,157 but through contracts, markets may harmonise faster, and more
effectively, than regulation.
Self-regulation through contract may not be as effective in practice as the IOSCO
SRO Consultative Committee and NASD claim. Despite globalization, states still have at
their disposal resources which they can invoke to impede the effectiveness of rules
developed within epistemic communities without the involvement of state authorities.
Scandals may prompt legislatures to enact new tough rules. Self-regulatory rules may be
invalidated under competition laws.158 The global rules which as a practical matter have
some effect across national borders are those which either do not (seem to) involve
public interest concerns, or which are produced in a manner which entails the consent of
at least some states.
3.2 CONTRACTS FUNCTION AS REGULATION
Contracts regulate the behaviour of the contracting parties. The extent to which
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159 See, e.g., Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 211, 229 (2001) (“ The
initial goal - and one of the key accomplishments of ISDA - has been the development, drafting, and
promulgation of standard form documentation for the OTC derivatives industry.”)
160 ISDA describes its activities as follows: “Since its inception, ISDA has pioneered efforts to
identify and reduce the sources of risk in the derivatives and risk management business. Among its most
notable accomplishments are: developing the ISDA Master Agreement; publishing a wide range of related
documentation materials and instruments covering a variety of transaction types; producing legal opinions
on the enforceability of netting and collateral arrangements (available only to ISDA members); securing
recognition of the risk-reducing effects of netting in determining capital requirements; promoting sound
risk management practices, and advancing the understanding and treatment of derivatives and risk
management from public policy and regulatory capital perspectives.” See
http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa_nav.html
161 Cf. Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939) (“The general law” is much
too general. It needs tailoring to trades and to lines of trading. Nothing can approach in speed and sanity
of readaptation the machinery of standard forms of a trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the
particular needs of that trade. They save trouble in bargaining. They save time in bargaining.  They
infinitely simplify the task of internal administration of a business unit, of keeping tabs on transactions, of
knowing where one is at, of arranging orderly expectation, orderly fulfilment, orderly planning. They ease
administration by concentrating the need for discretion and decision in such personnel as can be trusted
to be discreet. This reduces human wear and tear, it cheapens administration, it serves the ultimate
consumer.” )
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contracts function as the practical equivalent of regulations varies with the context.
Contracts with larger numbers of parties, or contracts concluded in the same form with
multiple other contracting parties, such as franchise agreements, tend to have more of a
regulatory character than bilateral contracts. SRO rules operate through contract and are
designed to function as regulations of their members’ conduct. Standard form contracts
have more of a regulatory character than individually negotiated agreements.
Financial trade associations have developed standard form contracts for the
international financial markets.159 They have done so as part of their mission to help their
members, and they combine efforts to develop standard documentation with the
lobbying efforts described above. Financial trade associations may describe the purpose
of their standard form contracts programmes as being about risk reduction.160
Alternatively, or as well, they may say that they are developing standard form
documentation in order to facilitate the development of markets.161 The Loan Market
Association (LMA), which has developed standard forms for syndicated loan agreements
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162 Loan Market Association, Multicurrency Term and Revolving Facilities Agreement, in The
Recommended Form of Primary Documents, July 2002 (copy on file with author) (LMA Agreement) (get
2004 version).
163 See http://www.loan-market-assoc.com/Public/lma_abou.asp?Display=Origins.
164 Loan Syndications and Trading Association, Model Credit Agreement Provisions, (Jan. 2004)
available at 
http://www.lsta.org/assets/files/Standard_Documents/Primary_Market_Amendment_Practices_and_Agent
_Transfer/ModelCreditAgreementProvisions_January2004.pdf  (LSTA Model Credit Agreement
Provisions”)
165 Id. at “Purpose and Scope”.
166 A court will decide whether a contract is ambiguous taking account of the norms of the
business context. See, e.g., In Re Okura, 249 B.R.596, 603 (Bankr. SDNY 2000) (a phrase is ambiguous
only if it is "capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person
who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs,
practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business.")
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for the London market,162 was founded in 1996 “as a response to market conditions and
to a perceived willingness on the part of the banking community to bring greater clarity,
efficiency and liquidity to the relatively under- developed secondary market that existed
at the time, and to enable more efficient loan portfolio management.”163 The Loan
Syndications and Trading Association in the US, which has developed Model Credit
Agreement Provisions for jurisdictions in the US,164 states that it developed the model
provisions:
to promote liquidity and efficiency, increase legal certainty, reduce
transaction costs in connection with originations activity, and limit legal
review for primary and secondary sales to an “exceptions” basis, reducing
the time and expense of unnecessary negotiation of boilerplate and other
mechanical provisions.165
When trade associations are successful in developing standard forms that market
participants use, the standard forms can function like regulation in that they set
standards for what is normal behaviour in the markets. What is normal may influence a
court’s interpretation of contracts,166 although it may not always be easy to determine
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167 Consider, for example the discussions of the meaning of the pari passu clause. See, e.g.,
Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 79- Pari Passu Clauses (March 2005) available at
http://www.fmlc.org/papers/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf
168 Association of Corporate Treasurers, A Guide to the Loan Market Association Documentation
for Borrowers, 12 available at http://www.treasurers.org/technical/resources/lma_final.pdf (“ACT Guide”)
(“It can be harder to negotiate a draft which is presented by lenders as a market standard than, for
example, a draft which is the standard form of a law firm.”)
169 See the “Joint Statement” at the beginning of the LMA Agreement., reproduced in ACT Guide, 
supra note 168 at 10. Cf. LSTA Model Credit Agreement Provisions, supra note 164 (“every effort was
made to balance the interests of all constituencies in the syndicated lending
market: agents, investors and borrowers.”)
170 ACT Guide, supra note 168 at 12.
171 ACT Guide, supra note 168 at 12-13.
172 Id. at 13-14.
173 Id. at 14.
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what a standard contractual term actually means.167
Normal contractual terms may also influence the behaviour of market participants.
It may be difficult for a borrower to negotiate contractual terms different from those
specified in the standard form syndicated loan agreement.168 The LMA agreement has
been designed “to balance the interests of borrowers and lenders”.169 The Association of
Corporate Treasurers (“ACT”), which represents borrowers, says:
For many Borrowers, it is likely to be advantageous to use as a basis for
negotiation a format which is becoming increasingly familiar in the market.
It is hoped that this familiarity will make for greater efficiency in negotiation
of the loan document and in the syndication process, leading to lower
costs for the Borrower.170
The ACT lists some of the potentially unattractive features of the LMA standard form,171
and also lists some “key points for negotiation”.172 However, although the ACT lists the
“increased costs clause” as a key clause affecting costs,173 it does not suggest that this
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174 Although some commentators suggest that changes in the Basle Capital Accord should mean
that borrowers will want to negotiate to obtain the benefit of reductions in capital requirements that accrue
if the borrower’s risk profile improves. See, e.g., S J Berwin, Basel II: The Impact on the Margin, 3
available at 
http://www.sjberwin.com/media/pdf/publications/banking/Basel_II.pdf#search='increased%20costs%20cla
use' 
175 The lenders can take account of the impact of capital; adequacy rules that apply at the time of
signing of the loan agreement by adjusting the loan pricing. See, e.g., S J Berwin, supra note 174 at 3 (“As
the effect of Basel II becomes more settled and as implementation approaches, it is likely that attempts
will be made to incorporate specific Basel II pricing into the provisions of the loan agreement. At that point,
Basel II will effectively drop out of the increased costs clause, just as some years ago the effect of the
current Basel Accord used to be excluded from the increased costs clause once it had been taken into
account in the pricing of transactions.”)
176 Although see  note 174 above.
177 See, e.g., Catrin Griffiths, Borrowers Revel in Volte-face of the Syndicated Loan Market, THE
LAWYER (Jun. 27, 2005) available at
http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=115955&d=122&h=24&f=46 
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is a provision which may be negotiated.174 The increased costs clause is designed to
protect lending banks (and subsequent acquirers of their interests in any loan) from
increased costs associated with changes in regulatory requirements, for example where
capital adequacy requirements change over the life of a loan so that the lender has to
have extra capital to cover the loan.175 The increased costs clause is designed to pass
such costs on to the borrower, but because the clause is drafted by banks and
borrowers have limited opportunities to negotiate its terms, the clause does not give the
borrower the benefit of any reduced regulatory costs.176 It is a one-way ratchet in favour
of the lenders.
On the other hand, at least in market conditions where borrowers have
advantages in negotiating favourable financial terms for syndicated loans they can also
negotiate favourable covenants. Borrowers’ lawyers have recently taken control of the
drafting of some syndicated loan agreements, in part because the LMA standard forms
exist.177
Standard form contracts may develop a dominant position where the market
benefits from standardisation and/or where standard setters and regulators encourage
the use of standard forms as a form of risk management. In the international financial
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178 Ian Sideris & Simon Puleston Jones, How to adapt ISDA documents for CDOs ,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW (Apr 2005) (“Ultimately, it is unlikely that a single standard form of
swap is going to emerge in the synthetic CDO market. The differing requirements of the rating agencies,
the continuing demand by investors for bespoke products and the desire of investment banks to create
new credit products through which they can make profits in an environment of tightening credit spreads all
mitigate in favour of continuing diversity and complexity in the documentation of synthetic CDOs.”)
179 Credit Risk Transfer, supra note 135, Recommendation 7 at p. 7.
180 See, e.g., Thomas A. Russo, Documentation Basis Risk - Hidden Legal Risks in the
Infrastructure of Industry Standard Documentation, Address at the 13th Annual Derivatives and Risk
Management Conference, April 25, 2003, available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/globaldoc/Documentation_Basis_Talk.doc  (“Use of multiple master agreements
allows the parties to tailor the basic terms of their financial transactions to the particular transaction. 
However, it also results in this documentation basis risk – the risk that transactions that hedge each other
will not exactly have matching terms, because they are documented on masters that have inherent
differences.”) See also Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, Improving Counterparty Risk
Management Practices, June 1999 available at 
http://www.mfainfo.org/washington/derivatives/Improving%20Counterparty%20risk.pdf 
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markets some contractual provisions have more of a regulatory effect than others. For
example, provisions of the LMA agreement regulate the relationship between the agent
bank and the lenders.
In cases where the market does not use standard forms, international standard
setting bodies may encourage market participants to develop or use standard form
contracts because of the connection between legal risk and uncertainty. For example,
commentators say that parties to swap transactions in synthetic collateralised debt
obligation structures are not standardising their contracts.178 In March 2005 in its paper
on Credit Risk Transfer the Joint Forum recommended that “market participants should
aggressively continue their efforts towards standardisation of documentation, including
for CDOs and other more complex products” in order to reduce legal risk.179
Standard form contracts often suit the interests of financial firms and regulators,
but they may impose costs on others who are not involved in the drafting process and
who will find it difficult to negotiate against the standard form provisions. At times the risk
reducing aspects of standard forms may be illusory: where firms are parties to
transactions using different standard-forms any inconsistencies between the different
forms may cause problems.180 The Global Documentation Steering Committee in New
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181 See, e.g., http://www.ny.frb.org/globaldoc/index.html
182 See, e.g.,  GDSC Recommendations to the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, May 7, 2003,
available at http://www.ny.frb.org/globaldoc/gsdc_final.doc
183 For example using credit default swaps to shift the risk of debtor default.
184 Joint Forum, supra note 135 at 5 (“With regard to the role of unregulated market participants,
the Working Group believes that market discipline as evidenced through effective counterparty risk
management is an essential element of a well-functioning marketplace. Market participants should seek to
ensure that sufficient measures are taken to address these risks with respect to all counterparties,
whether regulated or not. In addition, supervisory authorities have a legitimate basis for seeking to
understand the aggregate amount of credit risk that is being transferred outside of the regulated sector.
While greater information sharing among supervisors, including developing a common understanding of
key concepts and terms, as well as improved analysis of existing and planned reports provided by
regulated firms should provide an increased ability to assess such developments, it will be important to
monitor progress in this area closely.”) See also, e.g., International Association of Insurance Supervisors,
Iais Paper on Credit Risk Transfer Between Insurance, Banking and Other Financial Sectors Presented to
the Financial Stability Forum (March 2003) available at http://www.iaisweb.org/03fsfcrt.pdf
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York works on trying to reconcile differences between standard-forms,181 and has
encouraged different organisations to take account of its work.182
3.3 CONTRACTS CONSTRAIN REGULATION
Contracts may constrain or undermine regulation if they are used to shift risks
away from regulated firms onto non-regulated entities.183 In recent years banks have
changed their relationships with their customers. Rather than acting as a long term
lender to a business client a bank prefers to be involved in arranging a financing facility
and to sell its participation in the facility to others. One of the advantages of structuring
lending in this way is that the bank’s regulatory capital requirement is controlled. The
ideal purchaser of a loan participation is an entity which is not itself subject to risk-
weighted capital requirements. But if the purchaser is a non-bank financial institution
regulators may be concerned about the shifting of risks from a regulated part of the
financial sector to a less regulated or differently regulated sector. Similar issues of risk-
shifting arise in the context of securitizations and CDOs. The Joint Forum concluded that
this issue should be monitored.184
Contracts may also constrain regulation where financial market participants
successfully argue that proposed or actual regulations undermine beneficial market
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185 State predatory lending statutes tend to be drafted to cover lending within the state rather than
lending by state chartered banks. This makes some sense if borrowers cannot easily distinguish between
state chartered and national banks and therefore cannot easily work out what rules would regulate
predatory lending. Opponents of predatory lending refer to “asset stripping” or “equity stripping” which can 
happen because of large fees charged in relation to the loans. See, e.g., Center for Responsible Lending, 
Comments on OCC Working Paper (Oct. 6, 2003) available at 
http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/CRLCommentsonOCCWorkingPaper.pdf (“The primary abuse the
North Carolina law, and other subsequent state laws, is aimed at is preventing equity stripping, which
occurs when lenders charge excessive fees. The problem of excessive fees for the subprime refinancing
borrower is two-fold: the fees seem painless at closing and they are forever. They are deceptively costless
to many borrowers because when the borrower “pays” them, with a stroke of a pen at closing, he or she
does not feel the pain of counting out thousands of dollars in cash. The borrower parts with the money
only later, when the loan is paid off and the equity value remaining in his or her home is reduced by the
amount of fees owed. And fees are forever because, even if a responsible lender refinances a family a
week later, the borrowers’ wealth is still permanently stripped away.”)
186 OCC, Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals 69 Fed. Reg. 1904
(Jan 13, 2004) available at 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-586.pdf;
OCC, Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg 1895 (Jan 13, 2004) available at 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-585.pdf
187 State predatory lending statutes commonly affect not just the original lender but also
assignees of the loan so that remedies available against the original lender would also be available
against assignees who had no opportunity to monitor compliance with the requirements of the statutes.
This liability could significantly reduce the value of asset pools in securitisations. See generally The Bond
Market Association, The Secondary Market for Subprime Mortgages. A Common Sense Approach to
Addressing Assignee Liability through Federal Legislation 2 (March 2004) available at 
http://www.bondmarket.com/Legislative/Subprime_Lending_Whitepaper_032904.pdf (“The secondary
market must currently comply with a patchwork of more than 40 varying and sometimes vague and
conflicting state and local anti-predatory lending laws. Such a regulatory environment negates many of the
efficiencies securitization and the secondary market bring to the subprime mortgage market. Anti-
predatory lending laws that assign liability to the secondary market for lending violations that cannot be
detected in a review of the loan documents will ultimately limit subprime borrowers’ access to credit.”)
188 See, e.g., The Georgia Bankers Association White Paper, Georgia Fair Lending Act. The
Unintended Consequences  5 (Jan. 2003) available at 
http://www.namb.org/government_affairs/fair_lending/GBAissuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf
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transactions. In the US, national banks have been arguing that the states and
municipalities do not have the power to subject them to controls on predatory lending
because of pre-emption.185 The OCC has supported this view.186 One argument that
lenders have made to support their arguments for pre-emption is that allowing state
predatory lending statutes to control the actions of national banks would impair their
ability to securitise loans.187 They argue that this would ultimately deprive borrowers of
credit.188
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189 See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s, Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance Transactions (April
2004) available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SF_legal_criteria_FINAL.pdf
190 Standard & Poor’s, Legal Criteria for U.S. Structured Finance Transactions, supra note 190, at
104.
191 The Standard & Poors analysis in its focus on issues of legal certainty also has implications for
possible federal rules on predatory lending. The Bond Market Association supports one Bill currently
before Congress. See, e.g., Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association, Testimony before US
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Hearing on Legislative Solutions to Abusive Lending Practices
(May 24, 2005) available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/Testimony-Subprime_05-24-05.pdf 
(The Responsible Lending Act deals with the problems that do sometimes arise from dozens of
sometimes vague and conflicting state and local laws by creating a uniform national standard for the terms
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In a securitisation the originator of income producing assets such as loans will set
up a special purpose entity (SPE)  to hold income producing assets such as loans and
issue securities to investors. If the SPE is sufficiently separate from the originator any
assets the originator transfers to the SPE will be removed from the originator's balance
sheet. Investors in securities issued by the SPE want to be sure that creditors of the
originator are unable to look to the SPE's assets in the event of the originator's
insolvency. Investors in the originator want to be sure that there is no risk that unhappy
investors in the SPE's securities will seek recourse to the originator. Clear and certain
formal legal rules about accounting consolidation, bankruptcy remoteness and the
meaning of "true sale" would comfort all of the participants in securitizations. In the
absence of clear rules, credit rating agencies have stepped in to define what it takes to
make structured financing work by setting detailed criteria for the rating of structured
finance transactions.189 Recently rating agencies have addressed the question of the
impact of state predatory lending statutes on securitisations as part of their general
focus on structured finance. Standard & Poor’s considers various factors including
whether predatory lending statutes provide for assignee liability, whether the loan
categories affected are clearly defined, what penalties apply and how clear the statute is
(including whether there are any safe harbors).190
Although this example of contracts (the securitisation contracts) potentially
constraining regulation (the state predatory lending statutes and also potential federal
level regulation of predatory lending)191 is a domestic example within the US it is not
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under which high-cost loans are made. Critically important, these terms are objective and measurable.
Under this legislation, borrowers facing foreclosure could bring defensive claims against loan assignees
under certain circumstances. Assignees could also be the subject of affirmative claims, or those brought
outside of the context of defending against a specific foreclosure claim, unless they could prove that a
reasonable level of loan review would not have revealed the lending violation in question. By observing an
objective standard for loan review that could reasonably be expected to screen loans with potential
predatory lending problems, secondary market participants can avoid potential liability. The Responsible
Lending Act also provides purchasers with a "right to cure", or the opportunity to amend a loan and
compensate the borrower when they identify loans made in violation of the terms set out in the bill. All
claims would be limited to actual damages unless a borrower can prove reckless indifference on the part
of an assignee.”)
192 Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating
to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ No. L 126/1 (May 26, 2000) available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_126/l_12620000526en00010059.pdf includes a general
rule of home control of credit institutions which is the equivalent of pre-emption. See, e.g., EU
Commission Press Release, Banking: Commission requests Italy to amend law on excessive interest
rates (July 25, 2003) (Commission challenge to Italian rules criminalizing usury).
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difficult to imagine similar arguments being made in the EU that EU level banking rules
pre-empt state actions to protect domestic banking customers like those the states have
been taking in the US.192 And eventually the WTO services agreement may produce
similar pre-emptive effects at the global level.
To the extent that contracts, particularly standard form contracts, can constrain or
limit regulation it is worrying that the processes which produce the standard form
contracts are private and opaque to outsiders and that they do not tend to allow input
from people who may be affected by them. 
3.4 REGULATION CONSTRAINS CONTRACTS
At the same time as contracts may constrain or limit regulation financial firms
need to worry about how existing legal rules may affect the contractual arrangements
they believe they have made, and about how changes to legal rules may affect their
contracts. One result of such anxiety is the type of lobbying activity discussed in Section
2 above. 
Some types of legal uncertainty may not matter if market participants can agree
to ignore the uncertainty. Within a homogenous community transactions may derive their
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193 R.B Ferguson, Commercial Expectations and the Guarantee of the Law: Sales Transactions in
Mid-Nineteenth Century England, in G.R.Rubin & David Sugarman (Eds.) LAW, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY,
1750-1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 194-198 (1984) (arguing that stock exchange
transactions in Britain in the nineteenth century were secure, despite being legally unenforceable).
194 See, e.g., Final Report of the Legal Risk Review Committee, October 1992, copy on file with
author. The Committee noted that ”markets cannot function efficiently without a strong legal foundation.
Promoting legal certainty, even though it is not the only relevant concern, is therefore of fundamental
medium- to long-term importance.” Id. at ¶ 1.2. The statement by Millett J. in In re Charge Card Services
Ltd.  [1987] Ch. 150 that “ a charge in favour of a debtor of his own indebtedness to the chargor is
conceptually impossible” was another factor. See also Re BCCI No. 8 [1998] AC 214 per Lord Hoffmann
(“The doctrine of conceptual impossibility ... has excited a good deal of heat and controversy in banking
circles; the Legal Risk Review Committee, set up in 1991 by the Bank of England to identify areas of
obscurity and uncertainty in the law affecting financial markets and propose solutions, said that a very
large number of submissions from interested parties expressed disquiet about this ruling. It seems clear
that documents purporting to create such charges have been used by banks for many years.”)
195
 The Financial Law Panel ceased operations in March 2002. The Bank of England had decided
that it could not indefinitely provide open-ended support to the Panel. Bank of England, Annual Report
2002, 5 (May 2002) available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/annualreport/2002report.pdf
196
 The Financial Markets Law Committee’s web site is at http://www.fmlc.org/
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binding effect from sources other than state-centered law.193 But actors in the
international financial markets are less homogenous than they used to be and they are
more likely to resort to litigation to resolve disputes than they were in the past. 
When litigation does occur, market participants frequently argue that courts
should give effect to the agreements they have concluded and should interpret the law
to facilitate this. Financial trade associations may submit amicus briefs in litigation to
argue for the market’s view. In some places governmental authorities or quasi-
governmental authorities encourage the idea that courts should avoid applying the law in
unexpected ways. In the UK, the Bank of England appointed a Legal Risk Review
Committee,194 then a Financial Law Panel,195 and most recently a Financial Markets Law
Committee to address issues of legal risk.196
Regulation may constrain contracts by limiting what a financial firm can achieve
by contract. Uncertainties about how courts and regulators will interpret contracts create
legal risks that financial institutions need to address as part of their overall risk
management strategy required by their regulators. 
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197 Some financial trade associations are recognised as self-regulatory organisations in states’
formal financial regulatory systems. Others exercise rule-making functions because their membership
wishes them to do so without any formal role in any state’s financial regulatory structure. 
198 The UK’s Takeover Panel was set up in 1968 as a non-governmental body to regulate take-
over transactions in the UK, administering the City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers. More recently,
financial regulators in the UK have required people authorised to carry on investment business in the UK
to comply with the provisions of the Code and to “cold shoulder” persons who do not comply with the
Code. See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, Endorsement of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
and the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares, Consultative Paper 87, 3 (April 2001)
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp87.pdf
199 The Bond Market Association, Practice Guidelines for Trading in Distressed Bonds, (Sept.
2004) available at 
http://www.bondmarket.com/assets/files/Practice_Guidelines_for_Trading_in_Distressed_Bonds.pdf
200 The Bond Market Association, Practice Guidelines for Trading in GSE European Callable
Securities, (updated May 13, 2004) available at
http://www.bondmarket.com/assets/files/2004PracticeGuideforTradeGSEEuroCallableSec.pdf 
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4.0 PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURS
Whether financial transactions take place on regulated markets or not, they need
institutional support, including support from rules, whether those rules are derived from
statutes and regulations or from contracts. Financial trade associations act as regulatory
entrepreneurs in developing rules which participants in the financial markets follow.197
Earlier sections of this paper addressed the lobbying activities of financial trade
associations and their actions in developing standard form contracts. But financial trade
associations also seek to influence market behaviour by the development of instruments
such as guidelines and market standards which are designed to affect the behaviour of
market participants. Although market standards do not seek in themselves to produce
legal effects, they may in fact produce legal effects if they are incorporated in contracts
or if regulations refer to them.198
The financial industry has produced a host of standards and codes and guidelines
covering many different subjects. For example, the Bond Market Association has
published Practice Guidelines for trading in distressed bonds,199 and for GSE European
callable securities.200 The European Securitisation Forum has published securitisation
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201 European Securitisation Forum, Securitisation Market Practice Guidelines, (June 2004)
available at
http://www.europeansecuritisation.com/pubs/Securitisation_Market_Practice_Guidelines_June_2004.pdf
202 Association of Corporate Treasurers, Association for Financial Professionals, Association
Francaise Des Tresoriers D’Entreprise, Code of Standard Practices for Participants in the Credit Rating
Process, (March 2005) available at
http://www.treasurers.org/technical/papers/resources/cspfinal_mar05.pdf
203 See, e.g.,  Edna Young, Financial Crime Sector Manager, FSA, Speech at the BBA 4th Annual
Fraud Conference (Jun. 27, 2005) available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/0627_ey.shtml (“Trade associations
can play a key role in collating this information and providing advice to their members on how to manage
their fraud risks more effectively. We see them as providing the lead in developing and disseminating best
practice.”)
204 Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets (Mar.
2005) available at http://www.iif.com/data/public/principles-final_0305.pdf . See also, e.g., Bedford et al,
supra note 153 at 96 (“An important recent development in ‘soft law’ has been the Principles for Stable
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructurings in Emerging Markets (hereafter, the Principles) agreed
between some key trade associations and a group of sovereign borrowers. The Principles constitute a set
of voluntary guidelines designed to add further structure and predictability to the relationship between
sovereign debtors and their creditors beyond that contained in contracts.”)
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market practice guidelines.201 Sometimes market standards are designed to fend off
regulation. For example, in March 2005, during a period of national and international
debates about whether credit rating agencies should be subjected to formal regulation, a
group of organizations (representing the corporate treasury function of issuers rather
than ratings agencies) published a Code of Conduct for Credit Rating Agencies.202
Sometimes regulators encourage trade associations to develop solutions to problems in
the market.203 Market standards may be useful in circumstances where regulatory
solutions are infeasible: for example, emerging market debtors, the financial institutions
which invest in their debt, and trade associations have agreed principles for the
emerging debt market.204
Private standard setters may have significant influence on the behaviour of
market participants through formal recognition of their role. In 2002, for example, the EU
adopted a regulation mandating the use of International Accounting Standards by
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205 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002
on the application of international accounting standards, OJ No. L 243/1 (Sept. 11, 2002) available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_243/l_24320020911en00010004.pdf . See also
Commission Regulation (EC) No1725/2003 of 29 September 2003 adopting certain international
accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No1606/2002 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, OJ No L 261/1 (Oct. 13, 2003) available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_261/l_26120031013en00010002.pdf ; Commission
Regulation (EC) No 707/2004 of 6 April 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003 adopting certain
international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European
Parliament and of the Council OJ No. L 111/3 (Apr. 17, 2004) available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_111/l_11120040417en00030017.pdf
206 Regulation on the application of international accounting standards, note 206 above, at Art. 2
207 See, e.g., IAIS, Comments on Identifying Issues for the IASC Foundation Constitution Review,
(Feb. 11, 2004) available at http://www.iaisweb.org/190IASConstitutioncomments11February2004.pdf 
(“we recognize the importance of bringing to bear the highest calibre of technical expertise and unbiased
professional judgment to standard-setting efforts. At the same time, we believe that the overall process for
developing these standards must include sufficient transparency and accountability to ensure that
strengths, without appropriate checks and balances, do not risk becoming weaknesses.”). See also IASC
Foundation Constitution (July 2005) available at
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/8_11_iascf-constitution.pdf 
208 International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Due Process of Iasb, Draft
Handbook of Consultative Arrangements (April 2005) available at
http://www.iasb.org/uploaded_files/documents/8_137_DueProcess.pdf 
209 See, e.g., OECD, Corporate Pension Fund Liabilities and Funding Gaps, 88 Financial Market
Trends 69, 91 (March 2005) (“Rating agencies have warned that estimated deficits in company pension
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publicly traded EU companies.205 International Accounting Standards are developed by
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),206 a non-governmental
organization which is funded by private sector firms. Commentators have suggested that
the dependence of the IASB on private sector funding creates conflicts of interest which
raise questions about the legitimacy of the standards it promulgates. The IASB has
recognized these concerns during a number of recent constitutional reviews.207 And,
imitating intergovernmental bodies such as IOSCO, the IASB has focused on increasing
the transparency of its standards-making processes.208
Other private sector firms act as regulatory entrepreneurs by setting criteria for
market transactions. Credit rating agencies assess the financial condition of issuers of
securities in the capital markets, and their decisions about how to treat different liabilities
can have an impact on the issuers’ ability to raise funds in the capital markets.209 Credit
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schemes are similar to debt. It had previously been thought that credit ratings agencies regarded pensions
as long-term liabilities with little negative liquidity implications, at least in the case of those jurisdictions
where pensions rank along with non-preferred and unsecured debt in the event of insolvency. Across
countries, there are differences in the status of pension creditors, but this status may be subject to change
in some countries. For example, making the status of pension creditors “preferred” rather than
“unsecured” is likely to affect ratings, particularly for companies where financial indebtedness is already
high.”)
210 See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s note 190 above.
211 See, e.g., BIS, The Role of Ratings in Structured Finance: Issues and Implications (Jan. 2005)
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf
212 See, e.g., BIS, 75th Annual Report, 1 April 2004–31 March 2005, 118  (Jun. 27, 2005) available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2005e.pdf (“structured credit products are very complex securities and
the risks involved might not be fully appreciated by all market participants. The covenants of many CDO
contracts can be difficult to comprehend and deal complexity has posed many modelling challenges.
Although efforts have been made to develop more realistic pricing models and risk management systems,
many market participants are still building up their analytical capacity. One consequence is that rating
agencies have played a key role in the development of the market. However, there is relatively little
experience with the performance of ratings on CDOs, and rules of thumb employed by investors in using
ratings on corporate bonds may be misleading when applied to highly leveraged structured instruments.”)
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rating agencies also set detailed criteria for structured finance transactions.210 Firms
which wish to sell securities in a structured financing need to acquire a rating from a
credit rating agency in order for the securities to be marketable. They therefore have to
ensure that they meet the rating agencies’ criteria.211 Rating agencies are also affecting
investors’ willingness to invest in structured credit products.212 Credit ratings are set to
influence the level of capital banks are required to hold when they are used as a
measure of a corporate’s risk. 
5.0 CONCLUSION
Contracts and regulation intersect in complex ways in the international financial
markets. This paper examines some of the ways in which non-governmental actors, in
particular financial trade associations, influence regulation in the international financial
markets through lobbying, through the development of standard form contracts and
through their own quasi-regulatory initiatives. Although some of the ways in which this
influence is exercised are apparent because of disclosures by governmental and inter-
governmental standard setters and because of disclosures by the financial firms and
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their trade associations, others are less transparent. Larger and better-resourced firms
are able to participate more effectively than smaller firms in these formal and informal
processes of regulation and quasi-regulation. Consumers tend to be distanced from
these processes by lack of resources, by lack of expertise and because they fail to meet
the eligibility criteria for participation. Thus in critical ways these governance processes
do not fit well with ideas either of top-down governance or of bottom-up governance.
